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FROM THE DIRECTOR
In this issue of The Journal, our Editorial section examines the relationship be-
tween improvised explosive devices (IED) and the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS). The evolving nature of humanitarian mine action (HMA)—particularly in ar-
eas such as Iraq and Syria—has generated debate on how to incorporate IEDs into 
the current IMAS or whether to create entirely new standards specific to IEDs. With 
thought-provoking contributions from Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining’s (GICHD) Guy Rhodes and Danish Demining Group’s (DDG) Robert Keeley, 
we welcome community feedback and contributions from the field for Issue 22.1 
(Spring 2018). 
Our Feature section focuses on stockpile management and highlights articles from 
Eric Berman and Benjamin King (Small Arms Survey); Marlène Dupouy (United Nations 
Mine Action Service); Elvan Isikozlu, Matthias Krötz, and Claire Trancart (BICC); Lee 
Moroney (Golden West Humanitarian Foundation), and Robert White (GICHD).
This issue’s Field Notes section features a tremendous selection of articles: in-
cluding discussions on HMA’s role in IEDs clearance by Craig McInally and Hans 
Risser (Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)), Sustainable Development Goals’ impact on 
HMA by Ursign Hofmann (GICHD) and Olaf Juergensen (United Nations Development 
Programme), and explosive safety awareness by Geoff Carton (CALIBRE Systems, Inc.) 
and Laura Grindstaff (Bristol Site Contractors, LCC). 
In addition, we’re pleased to feature two photographic essays in this issue. 
Photographer Ian Alderman writes about his exhibition, “Recovering the Past,” an 
innovative project that brings together two separate groups of men whose origins 
are a century apart albeit united from the First World War through present-day con-
flicts. His exhibit is currently featured at the United Nations in Geneva and as a com-
ponent of the centenary commemorations to the Battle of Passchendaele at the In 
Flanders Fields Museum, Ypres, Belgium. In addition, Vanessa Finson (NPA) and world-
renowned photographer Giovanni Diffidenti essay the government of Colombia, las 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarais de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) and 
NPA’s joint pilot project to survey and clear anti-personnel mines and explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW).
Recognizing the importance of ordnance identification resources: Roly Evans (GICHD) 
and Eric de Brun (Ripple Design) highlight the Collaborative ORDnance Data Repository’s 
(CORD) 2018 upgrades, and Howard Rudat (MAPPS, Inc.) reports on his Landmines App 
mobile application. Additionally, this issue presents the research conducted by Andy 
Smith (University of Genoa) and William Bagley (Johns Hopkins University) on their 
Black Adder disruptors, which are designed to provide explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) operatives with open-source information on low-cost disruptors. 
For those of you who have not yet discovered James Madison University’s Scholarly 
Commons or simply “the repository,” I invite you to explore the site. The repository 
is housed within Digital Commons, the leading hosted repository software for uni-
versities, colleges, law schools, and research centers. Scholarly material and special 
collections in Digital Commons repositories are easily discoverable in Google, Google 
Scholar, and other search engines. Additionally, articles in Digital Commons reposito-
ries are indexed in the Digital Commons Network, a free discovery tool for full text 
scholarly articles used by researchers worldwide. The Journal archives are housed in 
the repository, and CISR is in the process of curating our own historical research ma-
terials to begin developing the world’s only online repository of mine action and con-
ventional weapons destruction documents. In the near future, we will be asking the 
community to contribute to this repository so this vital information is not lost. Please 
explore The Journal repository here http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/.
KEN RUTHERFORD, DIRECTOR
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILIZATION AND RECOVERY
JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY
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The evolving nature of humanitarian mine action—particularly in areas such as Iraq 
and Syria—has generated debate as to whether new standards on improvised explo-
sive devices (IED) should be included in current International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS), or whether such standards specific to IEDs should stand alone. We invited 
opinion on this subject, encourage conversation and debate, and welcome responses 
to be published online and/or in print in Issue 22.1.
The views expressed in articles published in The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, James Madison University, or 
the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery.
If readers would like to respond to editorials contained herein or submit an edi-
torial to The Journal, please contact the publications staff at: cisr-journal@jmu.edu.
by Guy Rhodes, Ph.D. [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
Improvised explosive devices (IED) are not new in mine action; they have contributed to explosive ordnance contamination in post-conflict settings since the advent of humanitarian demin-
ing almost 30 years ago.1,2 
What is new is that the systematic deployment of IEDs by armed 
groups is occurring today on a greater scale. The prevalence of use 
of these weapons by highly visible groups such as the Islamic State 
has accentuated the profile of IEDs even further. In addition, a large 
proportion of the IEDs deployed are victim-operated (VOIED) and 
contribute to a new landmine emergency characterized by a system-
atic production, standardization of designs, and the deployment of 
hundreds of thousands of locally-manufactured landmines. These 
recent developments have led to debate on how IEDs are defined in 
relation to key conventions such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC), on the required competency levels needed to 
engage in IED disposal (IEDD) activities, and on the applicability 
of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to provide the 
framework for mine action operations concerning IEDs.
This editorial provides a historic perspective on the extent of 
IEDD operations conducted by mine action actors, explains the 
scope and applicability of the IMAS to address all explosive ord-
nance including improvised devices, and suggests amendments to 
the IMAS to provide improved guidance to respond to IED contam-
ination in a humanitarian context.3 
A Historical Perspective
Since the late 1980s, humanitarian demining in Afghanistan 
has addressed VOIEDs as an integral part of mine action op-
erations. The HALO Trust, for instance, has cleared over 1,400 
IEDs in Afghanistan during this period. In Sri Lanka, the same 
organization has cleared almost 74,000 locally-manufactured 
landmines (over one-third of all landmines cleared by the orga-
nization in Sri Lanka), and some 1,250 more complex IEDs since 
2002. In Colombia, a further 280 locally-manufactured land-
mines were cleared by The HALO Trust between 2013 and 2016.4 
In Iraq and Syria, during the course of the last 12 months, 
MAG (Mines Advisory Group) cleared nearly 16,000 IEDs, mostly 
locally-manufactured landmines, but also sizeable numbers of 
radio-controlled, and command-detonated anti-vehicle devices 
that were abandoned (see Figures 3 and 4).5
Elsewhere in the world, improvised devices are addressed within 
mine action programs from Africa (e.g., Angola), to Europe (e.g., 
Kosovo), and to Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand). Few major conflicts 
have occurred where improvised devices have not contributed to ex-
plosive contamination. In all these cases, the survey and clearance 
of improvised devices by mine action operators were undertaken 
within the framework of the IMAS. Image 2 presents examples of 
the wide array of IEDs addressed by mine action operators.
Colombia is a case in point. A large portion of the territory in 
Colombia is contaminated with IEDs laid by armed groups (see 
Figure 1). The great majority of the IEDs are victim-operated, 
locally-manufactured landmines (see Image 1), but other types of 
devices including timer-initiated and command-initiated IEDs are 
also present. Among further threats, there are gas cylinders used as 
projectiles, as well as improvised mortars and rockets, which often 
use explosives that have been prepared in an artisanal manner. In 
Colombia, 11,485 victims have been recorded since 1990.6 
Colombia has been guided by the IMAS in its efforts to address 
this contamination. It has used them to develop a full set of National 
Mine Action Standards (NMAS) as a framework to manage the na-
tional program of land release. 
The Objective and Scope of the IMAS
The IMAS have been developed to provide a safety, quality, and 
operational framework for mine action and to promote a com-
mon and consistent approach to the conduct of mine action oper-
ations. The IMAS provide guidance, establish principles, and—in 
some cases—define international requirements and specifications. 
They offer a frame of reference, which encourages managers of mine 
action programs and projects to achieve and demonstrate agreed 
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levels of effectiveness and safety. The IMAS provide a common lan-
guage, and recommends the formats and rules for handling data, 
which enables the accurate and timely exchange of information.7 
The IMAS are not themselves standard operating procedures 
(SOP). They provide a framework for NMAS, local SOPs, rules, in-
structions, and codes of practice—documents that provide more 
details on how mine action requirements are to be achieved in a par-
ticular context.
Critically, the IMAS are framed by a humanitarian imperative 
where landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are con-
sidered first and foremost a humanitarian concern and should 
be addressed from a humanitarian perspective (see Figure 2). In 
this regard, the framing of standards and their application to na-
tional mine action programs ref lect the fundamental humanitar-
ian principles of neutrality, impartiality, equality, and humanity 
so that mine action is focused on giving support to those who are 
most vulnerable.8 
Mine action operations are therefore not defined by weap-
on type (i.e., they include improvised devices) but by the ob-
jectives they pursue (i.e., humanitarian) and by the context 
in which they are conducted (i.e., one that permits respect for 
humanitarian principles).
As mentioned, the engagement of mine action operators in 
IEDD has, and should continue to follow, the same principles 
used for humanitarian demining operations. As such, engagement 
should continue to be based on a positive response to the following 
four questions: 
• Is the aim of the task humanitarian (as opposed to security 
or military)?
• Is the environment conducive for safe and secure operations?
• Is humanitarian access possible and the device out of play 
and cold?9 
• Does the operator have the necessary skills and equipment to 
undertake the relevant search and disposal operation?
If a threat assessment determines that an IED is still within an 
active setting and no humanitarian access is possible, then it is a mat-
ter for relevant security forces to address. Furthermore, if a device is of 
a complexity that requires a skillset or equipment that is not present, 
then additional internal competencies must be developed, equip-
ment purchased or specialist assistance requested. Such an approach 
is not restricted to IEDs but is the same for all explosive ordnance dis-
posal (EOD) operations concerning landmines and ERW.
None of this is meant to downplay the challenges associated with 
responses to IEDs. However, it is important to note that adopting a 
sound, risk-management approach for IEDs is similar to that for the 
wide spectrum of unexploded ordnance (UXO), which can range from 
simple items, such as grenades, all the way through to complex items 
such as surface-to-air missiles with hypergolic, liquid-fueled systems. 
Factors that Complicate the Debate on IEDs
Current debates on who should be doing what and where with 
regards to IEDD, particularly in the Middle East, are testament to 
Figure 1. Extent of mine contamination in Colombia (2017).
Figure courtesy of DAICMA.
Image 1. An example of an improvised landmine found in Colombia.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
What are the limitations for mine action 
operators to engage with IEDs? Is this 
different from other explosive devices?
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the existence of differing perspectives on IEDs. Military, commer-
cial, and NGO operators all have valid positions but also different 
objectives and references in their work, as well as different modali-
ties, competencies, and capabilities. 
The current debate has some strong parallels with those asso-
ciated with the early days of mine action when
• Issues of ownership of the topic of demining between NGOs, 
commercial, and military took place.
• NGO involvement in broader EOD—in addition to demin-
ing—was questioned. 
• Challenges existed in understanding requirements for a transi-
tion from a military context to a humanitarian one. 
• There was a need to establish competence requirements for 
humanitarian operations and associated training responses.
In all these past instances, the conclusions of the debates result-
ed in the increase of empowerment of mine action actors and ul-
timately the strengthening of the IMAS to more comprehensively 
frame operations that support humanitarian objectives. 
In the current debate on ownership of the IED issue, it is impor-
tant to safeguard the IMAS as the principle framework for IEDD 
work that is bounded by the objectives and contexts appropriate 
for mine action. To optimize the effectiveness of IEDD activities, 
however, collaboration between military, commercial, and NGO 
operators is important at a procedural level, including appropriate 
information exchange.
Current discussions on IEDs from both a political and operation-
al perspective are complicated by the term IED, that is not at all spe-
cific but used to describe many different devices which may have 
only one thing in common—the fact that their construction is im-
provised or that they are locally-manufactured. The many types and 
classifications of IEDs vary from simple to complex, and have been 
characterized in a lexicon published by the United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS).10 They include time-delayed IEDs, pro-
jected IEDs, and command IEDs, including suicide IEDs in vests 
and on vehicle-borne platforms.
There is also a supposition that IEDs are all complex devices, 
whereas, in reality, while they can present considerable additional 
technical challenges during search and disposal operations, IEDs 
can also be relatively simple and standardized in design. The 
vast majority of IEDs addressed to date in Iraq and Syria exist as 
locally manufactured landmines. They have been produced on a 
massive scale by the Islamic State and are more readily detected and 
disposed of than many industrially-manufactured landmines that 
may, for instance, have a low metal content.
The rising impact of IED attacks in public places has been ex-
tensively documented by Action On Armed Violence (AOAV).11 
Armed groups play an active and influential role in wars in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, and pose serious 
threats to national security in Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Such IED attacks 
Figure 2. A schematic to illustrate the objective and scope of the IMAS. The IMAS provide a framework to guide mine action in pursuit of its  
humanitarian objectives and in accordance with humanitarian principles. 
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
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Mine action operators have always carried out risk assessments 
ahead of operations, however, this process has largely been implic-
it in SOPs or has relied on the experience from field staff. Given the 
complexity of some of the devices found in environments such as 
in Iraq and Syria, there is a real need to carry out more explicit risk 
assessments.15 This is reinforced by asymmetry of many conflicts, 
where large-scale battles cease but armed actors continue to exert 
influence and make use of explosives to disrupt and destabilize se-
curity. There is a requirement to systematize the evaluation of such 
contexts to ensure that mine action remains focused on humani-
tarian objectives and aims to uphold humanitarian principles. A 
more formalized guidance will benefit all mine action operations— 
whether in settings that exhibit IED contamination or otherwise.
The IMAS place a high priority on the issue of efficiency and 
the importance of targeting mine action resources appropriately. 
In rural environments, non-technical survey helps target clearance 
assets at suspected (SHA) or confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) 
based on evidence. In addition, specific training to improve eval-
uation skills and the ability of survey teams to accurately define 
such areas is elaborated in the IMAS. Similar guidance that targets 
the urban environment is lacking—including methodology for ur-
ban assessments, such as how to assess urban structures, take into 
account rubble (including rubble contaminated by explosive ord-
nance), and deal with threats of IEDs hidden in residential, occu-
pational, and community premises. 
Strengthening of the IMAS 
The IMAS have been designed as evolving standards that are con-
stantly reviewed and updated to ensure that they stay relevant and 
applicable to the changing nature of settings where mine action ac-
tivities are conducted. 
The IMAS currently fall short in the necessary guidance to ad-
dress tasks concerning IEDs. As a consequence, there is mounting 
consensus from the IMAS Review Board members to suggest that 
in light of the current political debates and operational demands 
there is a need to:
raise the profile of IEDs as an issue of con-
cern, but most incidents relate to car bombs 
and suicide attacks that fall well outside the 
parameters of mine action and the IMAS. 
Such devices and circumstances should be 
dealt with in separate guides and standards 
for use by security forces.
Incidents involving IEDs should be un-
packed to separate IED terror attacks using 
command detonation from those initiated 
by victims. IED operations in response to 
terror attacks fall within the purview of se-
curity forces. This is a different context than 
that where civilians are threatened from en-
during contamination from IEDs and that 
can be addressed during humanitarian op-
erations. 
Applicability of the IMAS to Address 
IEDs Today
The IMAS as they stand already cover ex-
plosive ordnance of an improvised nature. 
IEDs are included in the current nomencla-
ture found in the IMAS and there are at least 
nine specific references to IEDs within the 
existing chapters. These references do not limit the scope of cover-
age of the IMAS to a certain group of IEDs, such as pressure-plate 
IEDs, but rather are all-encompassing.12 
Key terms used by the mine action sector, such as explosive ord-
nance, landmines (in particular anti-personnel landmines), ERW 
and its components, such as UXO and abandoned explosive ord-
nance (AXO), include improvised devices within the context of the 
IMAS glossary.13,14 
Explicit and implicit references to IEDs in the IMAS have al-
lowed programs to frame operations that concern improvised 
devices within the existing standards. National programs in 
Afghanistan, Angola, Sri Lanka, and particularly Colombia are 
testament to this. 
Notwithstanding the framework that the IMAS provide for IEDD 
activities, there is a significant shortfall in the explicit guidance on 
IEDs in the IMAS. These deficiencies in the standards have become 
increasingly apparent as international attention focuses on countries 
such as Iraq and Syria, where the explosive contamination, partic-
ularly in areas formally under the control of the Islamic State, in-
cludes unexploded and abandoned IEDs, in urban as well as rural 
settings. In such theaters, operators have to review skill sets of their 
field staff, and national authorities are under pressure to scrutinize 
accreditation procedures of organizations under their responsibility. 
Furthermore, donors consider value for money from a wide variety 
of proposals and look to issue grants and contracts with appropriate 
reference to international norms. All such actors look to the IMAS 
for guidance on IEDD, currently with only limited success.
A focus on the additional guidance necessary in current contexts, 
including IEDs in the urban environment, is overdue. IEDs in these 
contexts increase the need for the IMAS to expand on: 
• Sound risk assessment processes. 
• Rapid and accurate surveys. 
• Safe and efficient processes for removal and/or destruction of 
explosive ordnance. 
• Reaffirmation of humanitarian, rather than military, 
objectives. 
Image 2. A selection of photos of improvised devices taken from archives of humanitarian 
operators.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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• State more clearly and up front in the IMAS the applicability 
of the IMAS concerning IEDs. Hence an amendment is need-
ed to IMAS 01.10, Guide for the application of International 
Mine Action (IMAS).
• Clarify selected terminology (IMAS 04.10, Glossary of mine 
action terms, definitions and abbreviations) due to inconsis-
tencies with other key sources of terminology (e.g., the major 
disarmament/arms control conventions, and the UNMAS 
IED Lexicon).
• Add elements of technical guidance that will assist national 
authorities and operators to ensure the safety and effective-
ness of work. 
Other areas being considered and supported by GICHD 
include:
• A greater emphasis on risk assessments and risk management 
frameworks.
• A strengthening of competency levels, equipment, and train-
ing requirements. 
• Further guidance within the IMAS or Technical Notes on 
Mine Action (TNMA) addressing mine action in an urban 
environment, especially survey and information manage-
ment considerations. 
It is important to recall, however, that the IMAS remain a glob-
al framework and should not dwell on specific and local contexts. 
There is ample opportunity in the development of NMAS to adapt 
international standards concerning IEDs to national contexts.
Summary
The IMAS have an established architecture developed over two 
decades of work that has legitimacy and standing. They have been 
developed for the mine action sector for operations performed in 
pursuit of humanitarian objectives and in accordance with hu-
manitarian principles, and represent the set of standards used to 
promote and maintain quality during the implementation of mine 
action activities.
Mine action operations are not defined by weapon type but by 
the objectives they pursue and the context in which they take place. 
The IMAS therefore provide the overall framework to address all 
explosive ordnance, including IEDs within the boundaries of hu-
manitarian action. 
The suitability of a mine action operator to engage at a par-
ticular location or with a specific explosive device is based, 
first, on the operator being clear on the humanitarian objective 
of the undertaking, and on it having access to humanitarian 
space and, second, on the operator possessing staff with neces-
sary skills and equipment to perform the task. 
Although hundreds of thousands of IEDs, including locally-
manufactured landmines, have been cleared during mine action 
operations within the framework of the IMAS, the standards are in 
need of being strengthened in a number of areas. These include risk 
management, competency levels, training and equipment require-
ments, and amendments to IMAS 01.10 and IMAS 04.10 to clarify 
their application to improvised devices and to address inconsisten-
cies in the glossary of definitions. Further technical guidance in-
cluding operations in an urban environment should be included in 
the IMAS or a supporting TNMA.
Matters relating to IEDD operations in military and security 
contexts should be elaborated outside the IMAS—whether 
procedures to counter IED attacks particularly concerning vehicle- 
or person-borne IEDs, or aspects of forensics or intelligence that 
could be used to bring perpetrators to justice. All of these are 
incompatible with humanitarian action and principles and do not 
have space in the scope and remit of the IMAS.
There is a priority, however, to protect the integrity of the IMAS 
to address all relevant explosive ordnance, including IEDs, as the 
primary framework to manage operations that are humanitarian in 
nature.16 
See endnotes page 66
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the IMAS Review Board 
nor of UNMAS, the Board's Chair.
 
Mine action operations are not defined by 
weapon type, but by the objectives they pursue 
and the context in which they take place.
Figure 3. Improvised devices cleared in Iraq by MAG between July 2016 
and August 2017 (IMP – Improvised; RC – Radio Controlled; CO – Command 
Operated). 
Figure courtesy of MAG and GICHD.
Figure 4. Improvised devices cleared in Syria by MAG between July 2016 
and August 2017 (IMP – Improvised; RC – Radio Controlled; CO – Command 
Operated).
Figure courtesy of MAG and GICHD.
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There is an ongoing debate about the need for standards for improvised explosive device (IED) activities. The emer-gence of civilian IED response follows the development 
of humanitarian mine action (HMA) in many ways. In particular, 
the problems of defining contractual targets and norms were prob-
lematic in the early days of HMA, when, as for the IED response 
today, money has started to change hands for services rendered. 
It is the premise of this editorial that the need for humanitarian 
IED (HIED) response standards derives from the contractual na-
ture of the relationship between the client and the service provider. 
Therefore, if they are to be of use, any new IED response standards 
for use in the humanitarian sector must not simply rehash existing 
technical military-oriented counter-IED (C-IED) procedures but 
must address the problems caused by the introduction of a civilian 
business model, and also take account of their relationship with 
the humanitarian sphere.
Such tasks, when conducted by security forces, are managed 
using what amounts to an honor system. Teams carry out work 
to the best of their ability, with supervision and quality manage-
ment provided through the chain of command. There are no re-
quirements for extra, contractual stipulations as work processes 
are defined by internal norms such as organizational standard 
operating procedures (SOP). 
However, when financial pressures are applied to services pro-
vided under contract, standard economic theory suggests that there 
is an added, economic incentive to increase output at the expense 
of quality. This was widely observed in the early days of HMA and 
a series of process controls evolved to address this issue. Thus, the 
question remains: what problems are likely to be faced in the qual-
ity management of civilian IED response, and what processes can 
be used to address these problems?
Definitions and Assumptions 
Firstly, it is important to take a view on the debate regarding 
the definition of IED and its relationship to other terms, namely 
(improvised) landmine and booby trap. For the purposes of this 
editorial, it is held that these terms overlap and describe different 
attributes of any particular device. The term IED refers solely to the 
way an explosive device is made, and a mine is a weapon activated 
by the victim. Thus, a device that is manufactured in an improvised 
manner and set up to be activated by the victim is both an IED and 
a mine. Similarly, given that a booby trap functions when the victim 
carries out an apparently harmless act, there is considerable room 
for overlap between the three terms. 
Secondly, there is increasing recognition in the HMA sector that 
the status of an IED is particularly relevant in determining the 
technical response. The sector is discussing the use of terms like 
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by Robert Keeley, Ph.D. [ Danish Demining Group ]
active and legacy to describe whether or not an IED is in play or is, 
in effect, an explosive remnant of war (ERW). This article uses the 
following definitions:
Active device. The term active device is used to describe any IED 
that is still under the effective control of the individual or group 
that deployed them, or where the local populations and relevant 
authorities in those locations do not wish to see them removed.
Legacy device. The term legacy device is used to describe any 
IED that is no longer under the effective control of the individual or 
group that deployed them, and where the local populations and rel-
evant authorities in those locations wish to see them removed. Any 
device that does not meet the definitions of a legacy device should 
be considered an active device. 
Thirdly, there needs to be a common understanding of what IED 
response means. C-IED is commonly held to be an overarching 
range of activities, including actions to:
• Attack the network (of insurgents using IEDs).
• Reduce casualties.
• Defeat the device.
• Train the capacity.
It is the assumption of this editorial that HIED response will not 
attack the network but can be involved in any (or all) of the other 
elements of C-IED. 
Fourthly, it is also the assumption of this editorial that HIED is 
as much a subset of the HMA sector as it is a subset of C-IED. Thus, 
this can be visualized as a Venn diagram (see Figure 1).
Finally, these notes are written to help understand how civilian 
organizations (both commercial and NGO) can contribute to HIED 
activities. One issue that has become increasingly clear in recent 
months is the difference between working in a humanitarian or a se-
curity environment (as illustrated in Figure 1). This is often linked in 
discussions about whether or not the IED is an active or legacy de-
vice (as described previously). While there is a link between these 
questions, the terms should not be used interchangeably. Rather it is 
suggested that the following distinctions should be drawn:
Legacy IED. Only humanitarian considerations are relevant.
Active IED. Both HIED and C-IED approaches are relevant, de-
pending on the requirement.
These notes are primarily intended to consider HIED under condi-
tions where the IED is no longer considered active or in play. There is a 
brief discussion at the end of this editorial about what difference an ac-
tive scenario might make to contractual standards for HIED activities.
Challenges: How Much Search is Enough?
All HIED activities—and particularly search activities—
represent a need to strike a reasonable balance between 
effectiveness and efficiency. One of the main differences between 
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IEDs and other explosive weapons is that IEDs are (almost) always 
disguised. As a result, significant effort must be spent to locate the 
device before disposal action can be taken. Given the range of com-
plexity (particularly in terms of disguise) of many modern IEDs, to 
always be fully effective one might have to dismantle all buildings 
brick by brick to be 100 percent certain that the building does not 
contain IEDs. This is akin to destroying the village in order to save 
it and is, in effect, doing the enemy’s job for them. Such a compre-
hensive approach to search is also very inefficient as dismantling of 
a building will take a search team a very long time.
On the other hand, there is potentially a perverse incentive 
for civilian HIED operators to maximize efficiency (particularly 
if they are paid by the number of tasks completed or the square 
meterage covered) by minimizing the effort (or effectiveness) of 
search activities. Without clear, contractual requirements and 
norms in place, there is a risk of ‘rush to the bottom’ quality in 
civilian HIED work. A similar problem was resolved in the early 
days of HMA through the development of clearance norms, re-
sulting in, for example, the need to search 100 percent of a desig-
nated area to a specific depth in area clearance, i.e., either mine 
clearance or battle area clearance (BAC). Quality assurance (QA) 
and quality control (QC) procedures were developed to help en-
sure and check that clearance was carried out to the required ex-
tent. Similar requirements can be applied to area clearance of 
victim activated IEDs (VOIED) where these have been employed 
as improvised mines. However, as described previously, this is 
problematic in terms of other search tasks, particularly building 
tasks. It begs the question: how much search is enough? 
Is it a new device, or one that was missed? Another problem en-
countered in the early days of HMA was when a mine was subse-
quently found in an area declared as clear. This often resulted in 
claims of re-mining even when there was no ongoing conflict. This 
is likely to be a more significant problem in civilian HIED activities 
given the very real risk of continued IED use by stay-behind person-
nel or renewed activity by insurgents. However, as in HMA, claims 
of re-mining may also be a convenient excuse for poor HIED activi-
ties. The use of formal handover processes and the retention of li-
ability for a task site helped reduce claims of re-mining in HMA. 
Identifying the difference between active and legacy tasks in what 
is emerging as the humanitarian IED sector has been an early step 
to help ameliorate this problem, but there is still a need to consider 
how to address any stay-behind IED activities in this regard.
What should be expected of HIED? A third problem addressed 
in the development of the HMA sector was the need to clarify the 
outputs (and hence outcomes) of various HMA activities. The de-
velopment of the five HMA pillars (see Figure 2) was an early but 
perhaps flawed attempt to do this.1 It was useful because it helped 
explain that mine action was greater than mine clearance. It was 
flawed because it mixed field operations with the advocacy ele-
ments of mine action, and specifically because it did not recognize 
the key role played by mobile explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
teams in dealing with spot tasks involving unexploded ordnance 
(UXO). 
Subsequent work identified the three main field products of 
the HMA sector as area clearance (minefield or BAC), mobile 
EOD spot tasks, and mine risk education (MRE).2 This clarifica-
tion in turn helps identify the incommensurate values of these 
actions: area clearance is something that produces cleared land 
and does not necessarily reduce casualties, and EOD spot tasks 
and MRE, which act to reduce casualties (either by removing haz-
ards or modifying behavior) but do not act to clear areas of land. 
These clarifications assist in the establishment of a Theory of 
Change (ToC) for HMA by setting out the different outputs and 
outcomes for the main HMA products.
Scoping HIED tasks
Defining core HIED response pillars. The core humanitarian 
HIED pillars can be defined as follows:
1. Search involves all actions to locate, access, and confirm sus-
pect IED, or to establish the absence of such devices.3
2. IED Disposal (IEDD) includes all actions required to make 
an IED permanently ineffective.4
3. IED risk education (IED RE) is an educational process in-
tended to reduce casualties from IEDs through the modifica-
tion of behavior.5
A Theory of Change for HIED
A similar treatment needs to be done to establish the metrics of 
HIED activities. Indeed, this can be considered the prime require-
ment to establish a quality management regime for HIED. A ToC for 
typical HIED activities can be summarized as in Figure 3. Danish 
Demining Group (DDG) is currently doing more work on the ToC 
for HIED, including a linkage with the Sustainable Development 
C-IEDHMA
1 7
2
3
8
9
4
5
6
Mitigate human impact Attack the network
Key: Typical examples of 
activities within HMA and C-IED
1.    Mine/area clearance
2.    Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
3.    Mine Risk Education (MRE)
4.    Search
5.    IED Disposal (IEDD)
6.    IED Risk Education (IED RE)
7.    Force protection
8.    Forensics
9.    Intelligence gathering
Figure 1. Interrelationship between HMA and C-IED. The rugby-ball-shaped area in the center represents the HIED response subsector. Note that 
humanitarian responses tend to focus on mitigating impact, whereas C-IED activities tend to focus on attacking the network. A list of examples of 
typical activities in both sectors, including in the HIED subsector, are shown in the key. These activities are discussed in more detail in the text.
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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Figure 2. The HMA Pillars.1
• CLEARANCE. Removing and destroying landmines and explosive remnants of war, and marking or fencing off areas contami-
nated with them
• EDUCATION. Risk education helps people understand the risks they face, identify mines and explosive remnants of war, and 
learn how to stay out of harm’s way
• VICTIM ASSISTANCE. Medical assistance and rehabilitation services to victims, including job-skills training and employment 
opportunities
• ADVOCACY. Advocating for a world free from the threat of landmines and encouraging countries to participate in interna-
tional treaties and conventions
• STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. Helping countries destroy their stockpiles of mines as required by international agreements
Goals (SDG), and it is hoped that this more detailed work can be 
shared soon.
Note again the incommensurate values in these different tasks. 
Search tasks, like mine clearance or BAC, do not necessarily find 
IEDs, thus they cannot be considered as primarily resulting in a re-
duction of casualties. They do however result in the release of safe 
land. Similarly, IEDD and IED RE do not result in cleared land but 
can be expected to reduce casualties either by the removal of haz-
ards or by the modification of behavior (again, this is akin to con-
ventional EOD spot tasks and MRE in the HMA sphere).
Also note that Figure 3 does not consider area clearance of 
VOIED fields. As has been made clear elsewhere, VOIED employed 
as improvised mines are covered adequately by existing HMA defi-
nitions and approaches, providing the appropriate equipment and 
detailed, render-safe procedures are in place. 
Possible Contracting Modalities and Deliverables for 
HIED Activities
There are two contracting models available to address the 
problems discussed in this editorial. Firstly, there is the output-
based model, as commonly used in commercial mine clearance. 
This model normally uses a firm, fixed-price bidding process to 
maximize efficiency. In an output-based model, service provid-
ers would be paid for the area of land cleared, normally through a 
pre-defined scope of works (including specifications of the prod-
uct quality) as included in the contract. This model is attractive 
for clients requiring a specific area cleared to a defined depth, but 
it lacks f lexibility in case of any new requirements identified dur-
ing the course of the project. It is also unsuitable for spot tasks. 
Output-based models are also particularly suitable for training 
or RE projects where the key deliverable is the number of train-
ing recipients. The main risk with output-based contracting for 
area clearance is ensuring effectiveness, i.e., that the quality of 
the output meets the desired specification, but this can be ad-
dressed with appropriate quality management processes.
The second potential contracting model for HIED activities is 
the service-contract model. In a service contract, the suppliers 
would be contracted to provide a capacity capable of carrying out 
pre-defined types of tasks for a specified period of time. Acceptable 
response times can be included in the specification. Service con-
tracts are suited to tasks that are not easily measurable in terms 
of units of output, and therefore lend themselves to more complex 
spot tasks such as a building search (or IEDD). Service contracts 
are flexible as it allows the client to deploy the teams when and 
where desired. Such contracts thus lend themselves to maximizing 
effectiveness, but there is a risk of poor efficiency if the client does 
not contract for the appropriate number of teams or if the teams are 
slow at responding. This can be managed through use of response 
time analysis and a contracting model that allows for penalizing of 
poor service provision.6 The application of these two contracting 
models in HIED is summarized in Figure 4.
It should be noted that it is possible to use service contracts for 
area work such as area or route searches, and this may be appro-
priate where a number of small or otherwise unpredictable search 
tasks are expected. However, there is an increased risk in lower con-
tractual efficiency as a result. It may even be appropriate to use both 
models, where large output-based search contracts allow for econo-
mies of scale, and service-contract models are used to allow for un-
planned or otherwise complex tasks. 
As has been discussed previously, one of the key issues in HIED 
search is that, unlike for mine clearance or BAC, it is not possible 
to define the scope of a building-search task in terms of 100 per-
cent search to a defined depth. A reputable search team command-
er will investigate any ground sign until they are sure that there 
Figure 3. Summary Theory of Change of HIED activities, key outputs, and outcomes.
Ser HIED activity Area or 
spot
Output Outcome Remarks
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1 Area (rummage) 
search for cache/
hides
Area M2 searched 
Cache found
Increased productive use of 
safe land
Note: clearance of VOIED fields as for 
HMA minefields
2 Route search Area Linear m/km 
searched
Increased productive use of 
safe route
3 Building search Spot Building 
searched
Safe access to building
4 IED  
disposal (IEDD)
Spot IED destroyed • Removal of hazard
• Reduction of casualties
Includes vehicle search
5 IED risk education 
(IED RE)
n/a RE given • Modification of behavior
• Reduction of casualties
As for MRE but taking account of  ‘do no 
harm’ and improvised nature of devices
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are no IEDs present, but the risk in a civilian scenario is where an 
amoral service provider decides to maximize profit through either 
expediting search quickly or by skimping on the training or other 
costs of the teams. Thus, in any circumstance where the only con-
tracting proviso is unit cost, reputable search teams will tend to 
lose out to providers willing to provide a cheaper but potentially 
ineffective service. 
Quality Management Techniques Available for HIED
The establishment of a quality management (QM) framework for 
HIED activities becomes easier now that the definitions of the ac-
tivities are established, their inter-relationships are clear, and a ToC 
for each activity is in place. Many of the QM techniques as set out 
in Figure 5 may be familiar from HMA. Others may be additionally 
appropriate for HIED actions, particularly for search. Figure 5 rep-
resents a summary of the various QM techniques. More work needs 
to be done to adapt them to HIED in detail.
Quality in HIED Contract Design
As set out previously, the handover process developed in HMA 
for area clearance is applicable to HIED area and route search. 
However, contracts for building search may need to account for 
finds after handover. This could involve the use of follow-up stud-
ies in the event of missed items to identify whether the search team 
could have been expected to find the item if conducting drills prop-
erly. The assumption of legacy items will be key in this regard. It 
may also be useful for such contracts to be able to cancel funding in 
cases of poor technical performance. The details of contract design 
will vary greatly with each funder, but it may make sense to include 
a periodic progress and quality review for the purposes of continu-
ing or cancelling contracts. One other point: it is clear that simply 
going for the lowest price in the absence of contractual benchmarks 
will not result in a HIED service that is fit for purpose.
Bonds, Indemnities, and Compensation
To indemnify is to compensate for loss or damage; to provide 
security for financial reimbursement to an individual in case of a 
specified loss incurred by the person.7
Given that a specific problem is how to ensure that HIED service 
providers guarantee that enough effort is spent on a search, then it 
might be appropriate to require some form of indemnity as com-
pensation in the event that an item is missed and then either subse-
quently found or inadvertently detonated. This could be in the form 
of a bid bond or through retaining part of the payments until after 
the contract is completed. The retention of part of the payment to 
ensure quality is a common practice in the construction sector and 
may be appropriate in HIED, particularly for search tasks.
Are the Problems Addressed?
Effectiveness, efficiency, and defining the scope of works. This 
editorial helps to highlight the tension between effectiveness and ef-
ficiency in HIED activities, particularly during search actions. The 
clarification of the outputs from different activities will help man-
age expectations. Whereas the products of area and route search, 
and IEDD itself, can be treated much like their HMA equivalents 
for the purposes of contracting, these discussions also highlight 
that building-search tasks are going to be the most problematic 
from a contractual point of view. Use of a service-contract model in 
addition to a strong accreditation and quality management frame-
work may be the best approach for funding a building-search capac-
ity, with an added use of bonds or indemnities against items being 
found after a search is complete. Price must not be the only criteria 
for awarding HIED contracts or grants.
Re-mining or missed items. In IED response actions against 
legacy items, it would appear theoretically clear that there should 
be no instances of re-mining. Providing an appropriate risk as-
sessment is completed by the contracting or tasking agency, work 
should only be done in areas where there is limited risk of new, ac-
tive items being used. However, it is realistic to recognize that a re-
turn of insurgent activity is likely in many areas where there has not 
been some sort of comprehensive peace settlement. Thus, the use of 
robust handover procedures will help mitigate the liability of the 
service provider, who would not be liable for devices found or ac-
tivated after the handover process, but strong QM procedures will 
help ensure that the task site is not accepted unless there is sufficient 
confidence that the work has been fit for purpose.
Implications for work on active tasks. One of the assumptions 
made at the beginning of this editorial was that HIED work would 
tend to focus on legacy tasks. However, this may not always be the 
case every time civilian organizations are contracted for IED re-
sponse work. Tasks may involve the full range of IED initiation 
mechanisms, and there is also a much greater risk of re-mining. 
The latter can be dealt with contractually through a rigorous appli-
cation of the handover process, and through the maintenance of a 
security cordon normally in place during C-IED operations to pre-
vent re-entry by insurgents in the period between IED response ac-
tivities and handover. The increased complexity of active devices 
(in terms of their means of initiation) can similarly be addressed 
by ensuring that the contracting process pays sufficient attention 
to the need for training, equipment, and procedures for time- and 
Ser HIED activity Output Contracting 
model
Key deliverables Remarks
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1 Area (rummage) search for 
cache/hides
M2 searched 
Cache found
Output based/
service contract
m2/km2
2 Route search Linear m/km 
searched
Output based/
service contract
Linear m/km
3 Building search Building 
searched
Service contract Availability of search team 
in working days/years
Monitored by response 
time analysis
4 IED disposal (IEDD) IED destroyed Service contract Availability of search team 
in working days/years
Monitored by response 
time analysis
5 IED risk education (IED RE) RE given Output based Number of recipients
Figure 4. Possible contracting deliverables for HIED activities.
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command-initiated devices used by insurgents in the country in 
question at the time of the contract, implying a far more rigorous 
accreditation process. 
It should be clear that there is no contractual impediment for 
non-profit organizations undertaking active tasks: the questions of 
security and impartiality are questions for each organization to de-
termine themselves, and should not be assumed or imposed exter-
nally. For DDG, the question of active and legacy is a key part of a 
rigorous risk management process. Other organizations, including 
commercial organizations, may have a different approach depend-
ing on their appetite for risk. They may also be willing to take on 
other C-IED and force protection tasks that fall outside this edito-
rial definition of HIED response.
Product definition. The third problem highlighted previously 
was the need to understand what can be expected of HIED activi-
ties. This is a question of product definition and this editorial has 
set out how the lessons learned from HMA can be used to formu-
late both a set of HIED pillars and also the outlines for a ToC for all 
three of these main HIED components. It is important to note that 
while conversations often focus on IEDD, the need to first locate 
the device (through search) is a significant product in its own right. 
Also, one must recognize that IED RE for local populations must 
account for both the similarities and differences between land-
mines, UXO, and IEDs.
Recommendations
There is a widespread demand for HIED standards. Firstly, it is 
recommended that any such standards need to focus on the con-
tractual parameters, recognizing that the significant development 
in HIED is the increased funding of civilian organizations to carry 
out such work. Secondly, in order to develop contractual standards, 
it should be recognized that the first step is to define the main activ-
ities carried out under HIED, and that in the humanitarian sphere 
these include search and RE as well as IEDD. Thirdly, it is important 
to adopt the appropriate contractual model to reflect the nature of 
the activity. Fourthly, a range of quality management tools can be 
adapted for use in HIED contracts once this process of product defi-
nition is in place. 
This editorial does not pretend to address the complete require-
ment for HIED standards: much more work is needed to develop 
such standards in detail. However, it is hoped that it has set out the 
main areas of focus that will be needed if it is to be possible to ef-
fectively civilianize some IED response activities in the humani-
tarian sphere. 
See endnotes page 66
Ser QM technique Description Time frame Remarks
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1 Accreditation Including assessment of training, equipment, key 
personnel qualifications and SOP
Pre-operations
2 Quality 
Assurance (QA)
Observation: adherence with scope of works 
(SOW) and approved SOP
During operations SOW = scope of works
3 Handover 
procedures
Formal acceptance of completed task by customer 
from clearance agency (for route or area search)
Immediately at end of 
task
Establish point in time for mitigation of 
liability
4 Quality Control 
(QC)
Post clearance sampling and checks Post-operation
5 Performance 
analysis
Including: 
• Number of items found after search
• Damage caused during disposal
Post-operation See discussion below
6 Accident 
investigations
Casualties caused by missed items or other poor 
procedures
As necessary Could be for injuries involving C-IED personnel 
or for civilians
7 Response time 
analysis
Comparison of performance compared to 
estimated norms, looking at number of tasks done 
and any backlog of tasks
Periodically Measurement of efficiency
8 KAP studies Measuring knowledge of people receiving IED RE Baseline and endline 
studies
9 Reduction in 
casualties
Comparison of casualty numbers over time Time-series study to 
compare effect of 
intervention over time
Can also compare with figures in area where 
program was not working (cross-sectional 
analysis)
Figure 5. Range of QM techniques available for HIED.
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PROMOTING SECURE STOCKPILES AND 
COUNTERING DIVERSION
by Eric G. Berman and Benjamin King [ Small Arms Survey ]
Poor management of government stockpiles of small arms and ammunition poses significant safety and security con-cerns—both for the country in question and often for its 
neighbors. Challenges to safety are readily apparent by the frequent 
occurrence and consequences of unplanned explosions at muni-
tions sites (UEMS). Security shortcomings include oversight limita-
tions that facilitate corrupt practices and seizures of state materiel 
by armed groups that undercut a state’s legitimate use of force, and 
undermine good governance and the rule of law.
The Small Arms Survey (hereafter referred to as the Survey) 
actively contributes to efforts to promote physical security and 
stockpile management (PSSM) and life-cycle management of 
ammunition (LCMA), and works with—and benefits from—
practitioners and policy makers focusing on these agendas.1 The 
development of the Survey’s UEMS-related research, for example, 
was made possible in large part by the active engagement of the 
Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG) 
and the financial support of the Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs (PM/WRA).2 The Survey also works closely with 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) in support of the Swiss Safe and Secure Management 
of Ammunition (SSMA) Initiative and other joint efforts, such as 
the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affair’s (UNODA's) 
SaferGuard program to promote the International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines (IATG). Survey databases and tools are 
frequently used to develop national capacities and to raise 
awareness among decision makers on the importance of adequately 
funding and meaningfully improving PSSM and LCMA practices. 
Update on Existing Tools and Reference Materials
Long-term readers of The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction will remember the Survey’s efforts to develop its UEMS 
Database.3 Early data collection efforts resulted in the identifica-
tion of over 400 UEMS incidents in more than 90 countries between 
1979 and 2011. The UEMS Database has since evolved, both in terms 
of the number of incidents entered and the additional data record-
ed for specific events. As of August 2017, the number of UEMS in-
cidents since 1979 totaled 567. UEMS have occurred in (at least) 
101 countries on every continent except Antarctica (see Figure 1). 
The database includes fields on causation, casualties suffered, type 
of site, ownership, tonnage lost, and some 50 other criteria. This 
data provides a basis for analysis to allow for greater insight into 
the human, financial, and political costs associated with improper 
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Figure 1. Countries with UEMS: January 1979 to August 2017. 
Courtesy of Small Arms Survey.
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ammunition management as well as an evidence base to 
support good practice. 
The UEMS Database has led to the development of 
two concrete tools aimed at understanding and mitigat-
ing the safety and security risks that improperly man-
aged ammunition stockpiles pose: the UEMS Handbook 
and the UEMS Incident Reporting Template (IRT). The 
Survey’s 2014 UEMS Handbook, which covers the peri-
od 1979–2013, provides a comprehensive overview of 
UEMS. Each incident recorded in the UEMS Database 
at the time is listed by country within regions, as well as 
chronologically for ease of reference. The publication also 
includes the Survey’s popular PSSM Best Practice Cards 
(see Figure 2), which also exist as playing cards.4 Other 
features of the handbook include an analysis of these in-
cidents’ scale and scope (e.g., their causes, numbers, and 
effects), an annotated bibliography and review of various guidelines, 
studies, and tools, and short overviews of some three dozen actors 
(e.g., the U.N. bodies and agencies, regional organizations, non- 
governmental organizations, and private companies) working to re-
duce the threat poorly-managed munitions sites and surplus am-
munition pose to people’s safety and security. The handbook also 
includes the UEMS IRT.
Despite important progress made in developing and strength-
ening the database, data-collection challenges remain. To a large 
extent, the UEMS database depends on open-source informa-
tion, such as media reports or other public documents. Although 
a useful source of information, such documents may be limited 
in terms of the amount of detail provided regarding the circum-
stances of the UEMS incident. Official investigative reports are 
often confidential due to potential legal liability concerns or to 
save face in light of improper ammunition management prac-
tices. Consequently, there is a dearth of information in open 
source reports, resulting in a paucity of detail surrounding cer-
tain UEMS incidents. 
In an effort to address the data gaps related to UEMS, and to pro-
vide states with a framework for investigating and reporting on in-
cidents, the Survey created the UEMS IRT (see Figure 3). This tool 
exists in Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS), 
English, French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Swahili. The 
template addresses six UEMS-related questions:
• When did the UEMS incident occur?
• Where did the UEMS incident occur?
• Who owns the site and the contents 
on it?
• Why did the UEMS incident occur?
• What happened as a result of the 
explosion?
• How did the state and the interna-
tional community respond?
The Survey continuously updates the 
UEMS Database and developed the UEMS 
IRT to assist in this process.5 The Survey 
knows that this tool is in considerable de-
mand from the more than 10,000 times it has 
been downloaded from the Survey’s website.6 
A challenge facing the Survey is how to en-
sure that this tool is fully exploited to devel-
op national capacities and good practice. It 
would also be useful to more fully generate, 
collate, and verify crucial information about 
UEMS, which can then better inform on the risks associated with 
ammunition management.
Even with existing challenges and limitations, the UEMS 
Database allows for important policy-relevant and agenda-setting 
analyses. For instance, almost one in six incidents involve muni-
tions stockpiles owned or managed by private companies or non-
state armed groups. This raises important questions about the 
adequacy of government oversight regarding the former, and 
about the utility of donor support to perhaps enhance some sites 
of the latter. Casualties suffered from explosions vary consider-
ably, suggesting that while it is not possible to completely stop 
incidents from happening, the implementation of good safety prac-
tices (like those found in the IATG) can significantly reduce such 
incidents’ ramifications.7 
One clear trend that defies easy analysis is the steep downturn in 
the number of UEMS recorded over the past five years (see Figure 
4). The rise of social media and global interconnectivity since the 
late 1990s might partly explain the relatively small number of re-
corded UEMS in the 1980s. If media and donor interest in this 
phenomenon has not diminished (and if the technology to report 
them has been constant), then the fall in the recorded number of 
incidents seems genuine. What explains this? More resources? 
Figure 2. The Survey’s PSSM Best Practice Cards.
Figure 3. (part of) the Survey’s UEMS IRT.
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Greater expertise? Better decision mak-
ing? A reduction in problematic stock-
piles due to the spate of explosions 
in the first decade or so of the 2000s? 
Transfers and consumption of large 
quantities of surplus ammunition to 
meet increased demand due to the grow-
ing number of armed conflicts? The 
Survey plans to address these policy- 
relevant questions by developing and im-
plementing a number of related projects in 
the coming years. Two illustrative exam-
ples include the LCMA Handbook and the 
Making Peace Operations More Effective 
(MPOME) Project.
The nine Southeast European countries 
participating in the Regional Approach 
to Stockpile Reduction (RASR) 
Initiative, which the Survey has been priv-
ileged to help support, have acknowledged 
that they possess surpluses and can improve 
on their current practices.8 Indeed, near-
ly 10 percent of the UEMS recorded since 
1979 in the Survey’s database have occurred 
in six of the nine RASR-participating states. 
The governments have sought to mitigate 
the risk of incidents by (among other things) 
destroying hundreds of thousands of tons of 
excess munitions. Some munitions destined 
for destruction have crossed state lines for 
destruction in neighboring states’ facilities, 
safely and in an environmentally acceptable 
manner. Experience shows, however, that 
progress toward reducing surplus is not a 
foregone conclusion and often occurs in fits 
and starts.9 Sales remain the favored mode 
of disposal for most governments, and re-
cent unplanned explosions in that region 
suggest that existing practices can still be 
improved and that the need to reduce sur-
plus remains a pressing challenge.
Governments in Southeast Europe and 
elsewhere often lack the financial resources 
to address the challenges posed by their ammunition and weapon 
stockpiles, and are often daunted by the legislative, logistical, and 
technical requirements. They often request international coopera-
tion to address these challenges. However, the rationale for and full 
extent of the sought-after assistance is often not well described, leav-
ing donors unwilling to support programs and initiatives that are 
not clearly explained and that do not lead to concrete outputs. To 
assist states to manage their stocks and reduce their surpluses safe-
ly, securely, and economically, the Survey in 2016 created a PSSM 
Priorities Matrix (see Figure 5). This tool helps states prioritize their 
stockpile management needs and articulate those needs to the donor 
community. Importantly, it moves states away from a wish list ap-
proach of asking donors for anything that might stick to a more con-
structive discourse. Similarly, the objective is to have donors reduce 
the likelihood for duplicating efforts.10
Overview of Ongoing and Upcoming Projects 
All of the previously-mentioned projects undertaken during the 
past five years remain important elements of the Survey’s ongoing 
work. The Survey is committed to developing its UEMS Database 
and utilizing its UEMS IRT more effectively. Resources permitting, 
the intention is to provide a 2nd Edition of the UEMS Handbook in 
2019. An edition of the popular PSSM Best Practice Cards with a 
LCMA focus is being developed, and the RASR effort will contin-
ue with new guidance from the latest RASR Workshop (held 3–4 
October in Podgorica, Montenegro). 
In light of the recent international shift in focus from immediate 
risk reduction toward a more comprehensive approach to weapons 
and ammunition management, the Survey has embarked on two 
initiatives that merit special mention: the LCMA Handbook and 
the MPOME Project.
The forthcoming LCMA Handbook is part of the Survey’s sus-
tained efforts toward highlighting the importance and challeng-
es of addressing ammunition fully across its life cycle, meaning 
cradle-to-grave. Geared to non-technical audiences (especially 
Figure 4. UEMS by Year, January 1979 to August 2017 (data for 2017 only covers eight months).
Figure 5. The Survey’s PSSM Priorities Matrix.
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decision makers and donors), the LCMA Handbook elaborates on 
the aspects required for the effective incorporation of the IATG 
at the national level. Indeed, one of the components of the hand-
book—a summary of the IATG’s more than 40 modules—will be 
made available as a stand-alone output and featured on the United 
Nation Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) website. As 
anticipated, the full study will be published in both English and 
French. As a first step, the Survey will work with MSAG, UNODA, 
and other partners, to make the IATG summary available in the 
four other official U.N. languages (Arabic, Chinese, Russian, and 
Spanish). The centerpiece of the Handbook consists of an LCMA 
Model that comprises four main elements: planning, procurement, 
management, and disposal (see Figure 6). The Handbook takes ad-
vantage of a case study on the experience of 
establishing an LCMA system in post-conflict 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and will incorpo-
rate examples of challenges and good practice 
from across the globe.  
The MPOME Project focuses on improving 
management practices of small arms and am-
munition within peace operations. Between 
2013 and 2015, the Survey developed its Peace 
Operations Data Set (PODS) that recorded 
attacks on peacekeepers in numerous mis-
sions in Sudan and South Sudan, and docu-
mented the loss of lethal material. In October 
2017, we released a study on attacks on peace-
keepers not limited to missions in those two 
countries, “Making a Tough Job more Difficult: Loss of Arms and 
Ammunition in Peace Operations” (see Figure 7).11 The report 
shows that the scale and scope of losses of contingent-owned equip-
ment (COE) in peace operations is greater than appreciated, and 
that improved practices could reduce the amount of materiel lost, 
and enhance a mission’s force protection posture and its ability to 
implement its mandate. The MPOME Project, which commenced in 
December 2016, builds on this work; it has four components. One 
concerns a series of regional workshops that will allow practitio-
ners in peace operations to share their experiences and, in so doing, 
chip away at the perceived taboo that such matters are too sensi-
tive to discuss. A second element involves working with actors un-
dertaking peace operations to develop countermeasures to better 
manage COE as well as recovered materiel in peace operations. For 
example, the Survey will work with the African 
Union to develop guidelines or standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for the latter. A third compo-
nent calls for the Survey to work bilaterally with 
states to learn how their peace operations training 
and oversight procedures have changed over the 
years to better manage COE and recovered materi-
el, and work with them to further improve on cur-
rent practice. Lastly, the MPOME Project provides 
for outreach efforts to explore additional partner-
ships and share the results of the various initiatives 
mentioned above. The initial phase of this project 
runs through March 2019.
Despite the significant progress that has been 
made in reducing the risk to safety and security 
posed by unsafe surplus materiel and in securing 
stockpiles, much more can be done. The potential 
policy and programming utilities of the UEMS 
Database and IRT remain underutilized. Other ex-
isting tools, such as the more recent PSSM Priorities Matrix and 
forthcoming resources, including the LCMA Handbook, will be 
more valuable with examples of challenges states and implementing 
bodies have encountered as well as of good practice. Many countries 
still view excess stockpiles as assets rather than liabilities, regard-
less of the conditions of their facilities and their ammunition or the 
questionable market for their wares. Moreover, many countries that 
would be willing to part with their excess and often aged materiel 
possess neither the know-how nor the resources to act appropriately 
(e.g., proper testing or improved storage). The Survey looks forward 
to continuing to work with states, practitioners, and donors at na-
tional, regional, and international levels to develop and promote 
tools and analyses to promote safe and secure storage and handling 
of ammunition, thereby reducing illicit proliferation of lethal mate-
rial and incidents of armed violence. 
See endnotes pag 66
Figure 6. The Survey’s LCMA Model.
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CROSSING THE FENCE: CHALLENGES 
OF OPERATIONALIZING PSSM 
by Elvan Isikozlu, Matthias Krötz, and Claire Trancart [ BICC ]
Physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) can be broadly defined as a series of activities that make nation-al stockpiles of weapons and ammunition safe and secure. 
Over the last decade, PSSM has become a highly requested form of 
intervention to curb the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons 
(SA/LW) and conventional ammunition (CA), as well as to keep 
communities safe from unintended explosions. Donors have pro-
vided substantial funding for PSSM activities to countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, where we have learned that the impact of PSSM 
assistance depends a great deal on how actively improvements are 
maintained.1  
Maintaining PSSM improvements has to do with influencing hu-
man behavior. Organizations supporting national institutions with 
PSSM are well aware of this but are often overwhelmed by immedi-
ate, tangible needs on the ground such as demands for new depots, 
fencing, or training. While these activities are critical, they will eas-
ily go to waste if PSSM is not practiced on a daily basis. This arti-
cle will discuss three challenges that we have observed and present 
some critical questions for organizations to consider when provid-
ing PSSM assistance.
Challenge #1: Leadership of PSSM
Traditionally, PSSM falls within the purview of defense and 
security institutions. However, since the Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) was adopted in 2001, as well 
as the entry into force of, among others, the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (2006), States Parties are mandated to establish na-
tional SA/LW commissions to advise their governments, security, 
and defense forces in developing a small arms policy.2,3 PSSM is 
part of this policy and is therefore in the purview of national SA/
LW commissions. However, these commissions are often not rec-
ognized or treated as the legitimate leaders of PSSM, nor are they 
given adequate authority by the top echelons of government. This 
lack of clarity challenges the ability of implementing organizations 
to roll out their assistance, as they may have to coordinate with 
more than one national body in order to access storage facilities, 
interview personnel, and/or assist in setting priorities. 
Apart from which entity is the physical leader of the PSSM port-
folio, there is also the question of whether this entity provides 
conceptual leadership of PSSM. This has also been referred to as 
national ownership of the PSSM portfolio. In some cases, strong 
national leadership is overlooked by donors due to conflicting in-
terests. However, when national leadership of this kind is missing, 
it is often provided by outside organizations or donors who may 
implement their own priorities for PSSM. There are a number of 
reasons why national and local leadership of PSSM may be missing. 
For example, these leaders may prioritize other security-related 
issues over PSSM, and some may even benefit from the status quo. 
There are also practical reasons why national and local leadership 
of PSSM may be missing—namely a lack of motivation and capac-
ity to practice PSSM—to which we turn to next. 
Challenge #2: Motivation to Practice PSSM
Requesting assistance for PSSM does not necessarily mean that 
motivation to practice PSSM exists. Even if motivation for PSSM is 
high at the top level of government, it does not automatically trick-
le down. Motivation needs to exist at lower levels of government 
by those doing the job. It is not enough to train security service 
personnel and armorers on what they should do for PSSM, they 
should also be taught why. In most cases, this means understand-
ing some of their grievances and findings ways to relay them to na-
tional leaders of PSSM. For example, some individuals working in 
armories expressed frustration over the lack of career opportuni-
ties for PSSM personnel, especially given the potential health haz-
ards and physical danger of working around decaying weapons.4 
It is also important to consider whether there are motivations 
to not practice PSSM. Some individuals may benefit financially 
from having unregulated access to SA/LW by renting them out, 
selling them on the black market, supporting poaching activities, 
or committing robberies.5 Addressing motivations against PSSM 
is a significant challenge for implementers and, more importantly, 
for national governments. They can be mitigated through greater 
job recognition, career advancement opportunities, access to reg-
ular training, and salary increases. These qualitative and quan-
titative benefits can also serve as incentives to recruit and retain 
PSSM personnel. 
SA/LW records, smoke grenades, and coffee mugs are in a local armory. 
The image demonstrates the lack of standard operating procedures.
All photos courtesy of Nikhil Acharya, BICC.
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Challenge #3: Capacity to Practice PSSM
The lack of institutional capacity to practice PSSM—and the con-
sequent outsourcing of capacity to perform certain tasks—is an-
other challenge to maintaining PSSM improvements over the long 
term. Conflict-affected countries particularly struggle to take on 
the many responsibilities of PSSM. Tasks such as drafting standard 
operating procedures (SOP), organizing trainings, and coordinat-
ing armory inspections need to be assigned to a particular institu-
tion with the ability to absorb these tasks as part of their ongoing 
operations. In the absence of these institutions or skilled person-
nel, external or seconded staff is often invited to take over some 
of these tasks. The benefit of outsourcing is clear: improvements to 
PSSM are made in a relatively short period of time. The disadvan-
tage is that little of the expertise and skills necessary to operation-
alize PSSM are left behind. 
Dealing with this challenge means considering how any type of 
PSSM improvement will be operationalized before the work begins. 
It means assessing what kind of managerial capacities exist within 
responsible institutions and building these capacities in lieu of or in 
addition to material assistance. For example, PSSM requires skills 
in project management, budgeting, human resource management, 
etc., none of which are specific to PSSM per se but are critical to its 
practice over the long term. It also means adjusting the expecta-
tions of donors and implementers to match the realities of the local 
context and not the other way around. Many institutional capaci-
ties required to meet regional and international PSSM guidelines 
are limited. Rather than overburden these governments, it may be 
more realistic and effective to search for localized, low-cost options 
for stockpile safety and security that can be maintained and im-
proved upon in the future.
Looking Ahead
To date, PSSM assistance has understandably focused on ur-
gent needs and threats by providing material assistance, technical 
A Congolese armorer locks up his armory. The note on the door and the 
lock show cost-efficient measures to secure an armory.
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guidance, and equipment to sub-Saharan countries in particular. 
Our concern is that these needs and threats will reappear if assis-
tance does not address the less tangible, more human-oriented and 
longer-term needs for PSSM. The impact of PSSM comes from how 
actively any and all improvements are maintained. This means that 
PSSM needs to be practiced on a daily basis and integrated into the 
ongoing operations of designated institutions. It is time to reflect 
on the extent to which donors and implementing organizations are 
supporting these needs and hence the operationalization of PSSM. 
PSSM does not occur in a vacuum. The challenges that we have 
outlined in this article are also shared with the wider SA/LW and 
CA management agenda. It is difficult for any donor or external 
implementing agency to influence lasting change on this issue if a 
country does not have a national weapons control framework in 
which to legitimize and prioritize activities. There is only so much 
work that can be supported and sustained from the bottom up in 
the absence of top down directives and leadership. The best way 
forward for donors and implementing organizations is to support 
a combination of both, and to continue to reflect on the impact of 
their contributions. 
See endnotes page 66
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ACHIEVING PSSM THROUGH CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND MILITARY COOPERATION 
by Lee Moroney [ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation ]
The core focus of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) is twofold: mitigate the risk of un-
planned explosions at munitions sites 
(UEMS) that could have drastic humani-
tarian consequences, and secure stockpiles 
from illicit diversion and munition theft 
that could fuel growing insurgencies, ter-
rorist events, and civil conflict by state and 
nonstate actors worldwide. These areas of 
concern increase the risks associated with 
national and regional stability. Increasing 
PSSM helps professionalize a state’s mili-
tary and security forces, which builds con-
fidence and strengthens security measures 
between security forces, the civilian popu-
lation, and its regional neighbors.
Previously a focus area of military-to-
military support, civil society—through 
donors, international nongovernmental or-
ganizations (INGO), and international or-
ganizations—have become more involved 
in directly assisting with states’ security forces in effective ammu-
nition stockpile management processes. Cooperation between civil 
society and the traditional owners of mine action (national mine 
action centers) has grown over the past two decades, yet civil soci-
ety’s support for a military role outside the five traditional pillars of 
humanitarian mine action (HMA) is still a challenge. Cambodia is 
no different in this respect, and Golden West has cooperated with 
the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) for two years now in 
PSSM best practice development. There continues to be support for 
mitigating Cambodia’s extensive landmine and unexploded ord-
nance (UXO) contamination, both by donors and organizations 
focused on clearance and land release; however, little focus was 
placed on the legacies associated with the ammunition that was 
stockpiled until 2007–2009 when a German organization, Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), conducted 
a project that addressed PSSM in Cambodia.
Program sustainability is necessary for PSSM programs to be 
successful. While Cambodia effectively had no ammunition stock-
pile or lifecycle-management practices in place, GIZ conducted 
training and introduced standard operating procedures (SOP). 
However, these practices were not followed once the program end-
ed. Since then, International Ammunition Technical Guidelines 
(IATG) were developed in 2011 to allow for a standardized struc-
tural approach to PSSM. There are many elements to consider when 
creating a sustainable program; however, long-term strategies of 
support are among the most proven. 
Typical storage conditions before reorganization within the Explosive Store House (ESH).
All photos courtesy of Golden West Humanitarian Foundation.
Inspection of ammunition in the Ammunition Processing Area: A typi-
cal condition of a propellant charge degrading over time, which re-
sults in the ammunition being unserviceable and in need of disposal.
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Through the Explosive Harvesting Program (EHP) in Cambodia, 
Golden West provided charges via the Explosive Harvesting 
System (EHS) and was able to readdress this gap in capacity sup-
port, as Golden West was already known to the RCAF. It took time 
for the interlinked and complex activities of a full, PSSM capacity- 
development program to be accepted by the RCAF due to civil so-
ciety being engaged in what is traditionally and culturally seen as 
a sensitive area. When developing civil society-military relation-
ships, trust is built over time, something that must be understood 
by all stakeholders to secure a sustainable and solid PSSM program. 
While the EHP program began in 2005, Golden West’s role expand-
ed in 2015, with the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in 
the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 
(PM/WRA) as the donor, to consolidate already-identified, unser-
viceable, and surplus munitions from lesser secure storage areas into 
a Central Ammunition Depot (CAD). Munitions not appropriate for 
processing into charges for use by the HMA community were de-
stroyed as part of the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) dis-
posal operation that is integral to the EHP.
Through stockpile reduction, Golden West support evolved to in-
corporate the capacity development components of training, in ac-
cordance with the norms of international best practices. Refresher 
training on the basic principles of munition storage and transport 
was necessary, which allowed Golden West to identify the key per-
sonalities within the regional commands who would continue to be 
assisted in their technical development. 
In the author’s experience, this bottom-up approach is not always 
appropriate. However, this first-aid fix was the most appropriate 
The Ammunition Processing Area, constructed with funds from the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), enables ammunition to be safely inspected in a controlled environment to enable RCAF to account for 
ammunition by its condition (serviceable or unserviceable). Golden West provided training to RCAF to allow for safe inspection and conditioning of 
its stockpiles.
start for the Golden West project in continuing to build trust while 
simultaneously assessing the requirements and implementing el-
ements of PSSM. This fluid strategy for project development con-
tinues to build trust and develop cooperation in what is normally 
viewed by militaries as a sensitive area, as previously mentioned.
It’s all About the Approach
The sensitivity issue is something that Golden West addressed 
from the start. Many within HMA are ex-military, and all partici-
pants recognized the right of a nation state to have the tools to de-
fend its sovereignty. This includes weapons and ammunition that 
militaries require to function as intended. Rather than pressuring 
countries into giving civil society access to ammunition depots so 
that civil society can identify unserviceable ammunition and poor 
stockpile management practices, the most efficient approach is to 
have countries enhance the capacity of their appropriate staff at all 
levels. This results in staff who can identify and account for both 
serviceable and unserviceable munitions, and allows for efficient 
stockpile destruction planning. This also facilitates the cycle of dis-
posal through efficient, munition lifecycle-management practices.
The obvious by-product of this approach is that the RCAF are 
able to empirically identify and accurately account for unservice-
able ammunition within military regions that they can then plan 
to incorporate into a disposal plan. In Cambodia, they continue to 
feed ammunition into the EHP and the country-wide HMA pro-
gram with ongoing donor support. 
Once up to a sustainable level, the RCAF will utilize its skill sets 
in order to properly manage its inspection and proofing cycles. 
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Basic items such as this locally designed and produced cage pallet help 
with safe movement of loose boxes of ammunition, where items such as 
banding equipment are not viable in low-income countries as a sustain-
able solution.
Members of the Cambodian PSSM team, composed of members from the 
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, the Ministry of National Defense, and 
Golden West.
Ammunition will always age and become unserviceable. By 
ensuring adherence to lifecycle-management principles, they will be 
able to continue to reduce stockpiles of unserviceable ammunition 
and increase the safety of current, serviceable stockpiles.
Benefits take time to identify at the national level, and the con-
tinual support by donors for the long-term vision is important in 
supporting these principles. Civil society is well placed to provide 
momentum and contribute to this movement. Once support and as-
sistance is at an acceptable and achievable level—with the develop-
ment and adoption of doctrine, policies, strategy, procedures, and a 
sustainable training program and curriculum—the intent is then 
that this norm will be naturally adopted as an integral and essential 
part of the defense planning and budgeting. Full national owner-
ship and a more appropriate part of the national budget can then be 
allocated for adequate ammunition management practices. With 
time, patience, and focus, PSSM cooperation between civil society 
and militaries is achievable. 
RCAF officers conduct group work as part of the Golden West PSSM 
Training in Depot Management Planning for allocating units of space for 
the safe storage of ammunition in accordance with explosive limits with-
in their buildings and depots.
An RCAF technical officer undergoing testing on box marking identi-
fication. Correct and appropriate packaging and marking are integral 
to safe storage, identification, and accountability of ammunition. The 
availability of original or adequate packaging for ammunition and the 
appropriate basic markings continues to be challenging in countries with 
stockpiles of legacy ammunition left over from past conflicts.
Lee Moroney
Global PSSM Program Manager 
Golden West Humanitarian Foundation
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FEATURE
STRENGTHENING SECURITY IN MALI  
WITH WEAPONS AND 
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
by Marlène Dupouy [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]
When insurgent groups in Mali initiated a rebellion for independence in late 2011, the National Guard and the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) in Gao 
were at the forefront of hostilities, which included the pillaging of 
weapons from government stores. Concurrently, the demise of the 
Gaddafi regime in Libya triggered an influx of small arms and light 
weapons (SA/LW) across the Sahel region and the return of fighters 
from Libya, making northern Mali their base. That challenge was 
quickly seized upon by jihadists and opportunists aiming to further 
destabilize Mali and enlarge their bases and activities throughout 
the Sahel region. 
Often referred to as the real weapons of mass destruction, SA/LW 
play a critical role in the perpetuation and the spread of armed con-
flicts. Cheap, durable, and easily concealed, SA/LW remain the pri-
mary weapons of inter-community tensions, armed insurrections, 
armed rebel activities, or terrorism. The illicit proliferation, accen-
tuated by the porous nature of borders in the region, has had a dev-
astating effect on development, governance, and the everyday life 
of communities.
Since 2013, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 
as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has been mandated 
by Security Council resolution 2364 “to assist the Malian author-
ities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explo-
sive devices and weapons and ammunition management.”1 The 
resolution also “calls upon the Malian authorities, with the assis-
tance of MINUSMA ... and international partners, to address the 
issue of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and 
light weapons.”1
The UNMAS contribution to weapons and ammunition man-
agement (WAM) has been innovative and holistic by combining 
practical, safe storage solutions and tailor-made, on-site facil-
ity management training, complemented by in-depth trainings. 
Lessons learned from working in Mali as well as input from oth-
er UNMAS WAM programs, including Côte d’Ivoire and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, led to the development of a 
technical guide to improve standardization. More recently, the im-
portance of WAM as a preventive measure against stockpile diver-
sion has been further strengthened by Security Council resolution 
2370.2
Implementing Innovative Solutions
Mali is a vast, landlocked country of more than 1.2 million sq km 
(nearly .5 million sq mi). The roads connecting the south and north 
are in a poor state of repair and are often targeted by armed terror-
ist groups in an effort to disrupt supply chains. Furthermore, the 
loss of state control in northern regions for years combined with the 
latest crisis has exacerbated the poor infrastructure situation. 
To respond to the priorities of the MDSF in such a complex op-
erational context, UNMAS had to develop the most flexible, fit-for-
purpose, and cost-effective solutions for weapons storage in remote 
areas. To reinforce the safety and security of government-owned 
SA/LW, UNMAS has proposed standardized solutions for the con-
struction of temporary storage facilities. These armories consist of 
a 20 ft (6.1 m) container and offer a range of capacities from 100 to 
220 weapons. Most include a separate compartment for small arms 
Example of armory kit provided by UNMAS Mali Programme, 2015.
Figure 1. Map of Mali.
All graphics courtesy of UNMAS Mali.
23
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 21.3
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017
24 FEATURE @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION
Armory provided by UNMAS Mali Programme, 2015.
Example of armory kit provided by UNMAS Mali Programme, 2015.
ammunition storage, with a capacity of approximately 2 metric tons 
(2.2 US tons). This ready-made solution can be implemented in one 
month with minimal supervision on site, thereby mitigating the risk 
of failure by local contractors. Containers are prepared in Bamako 
or other main cities before being transported and assembled on-
site, thus limiting the risk of exposure of both local contractors and 
UNMAS personnel. This temporary and mobile solution allows the 
MDSF to move their storage facilities if need be. These turn-key 
rehabilitation projects are easily duplicable at a relatively low cost 
(USD$10,000 per unit).
To date, 22 such facilities have been constructed or rehabili-
tated in northern Mali, including remote locations such as Diré, 
Niafunké, Goundam, and Ménaka. Additionally, to support the 
MDSF while on operational deployment, armory kit solutions were 
developed. The kits are composed of a container, metallic base-
ment, mobile roof, ventilations, mobile solar panels, gun racks, un-
loading bays, etc., and are mobile, easily transportable, and fast to 
assemble in the field with minimal skills. They are intended to ease 
deployment and provide safer storage for both SA/LW and their 
ammunition. They can be installed with minimal technical knowl-
edge, skills, and means.  
The team in Mali pioneered a “Technical Booklet for tempo-
rary armouries” that serves as a tool for learning and improving 
the quality of design and construction of weapons storage facili-
ties across UNMAS field programs. Following this successful ini-
tiative, the focus of the team shifted to efforts at standardizing 
ammunition storage solutions. These turn-key solutions are easily 
applicable by the United Nations, NGOs, or private operators that 
constitute the WAM community.  
Aiming to ensure sustainability through national ownership, 
Malian personnel in charge of newly rehabilitated armories also 
benefit from tailor-made WAM induction training. This three-day 
training package is delivered on-site and is aimed at supporting the 
operationalization of the armory and enhancing the capacity of the 
MDSF to operate safely. The training is conducted in parallel to oth-
er qualifying WAM training in Bamako. Complementing these safe 
storage initiatives, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training, 
mentorship, and specialized equipment were provided to support a 
national capacity to conduct bulk demolitions.
Contributing to Stabilization Efforts
Improved WAM contributed to stabilization and redeployment 
efforts by enabling the MDSF to access safe SA/LW and ammuni-
tion stockpiles in areas of operation, as well as by impeding the pil-
laging of weapons and ammunition stocks and their deployment 
during hostilities in Mali. All uniformed services deployed in re-
mote areas—namely the MDSF, the Water and Forestry units, the 
Customs and the Penitentiary Administration—have benefited 
from such support. Among them, the National Guard is the most 
decentralized service and often targeted by terrorist attacks across 
the country. The National Guard plays a critical role in the rede-
ployment of state authority in the most remote areas with direct 
contact with local populations. The rehabilitation of weapons and 
ammunition storage areas in central and northern Mali, as well as 
the provision of trainings, contribute to the return of state authority 
in these areas by strengthening the capacity of state institutions—
in this case Malian Defense and Security Forces to securely store 
their weaponry. In addition, it helps to foster the conditions that are 
necessary for the redeployment of MDSF in central and northern 
Mali. UNMAS has supported this security force with the rehabili-
tation of armories in Gao, Ménaka, and soon-to-be Gossi, as well as 
with the delivery of various WAM induction trainings that enable 
the National Guard to be operational and to prevent looting of na-
tional stockpiles. 
When interviewed on 7 August 2017, the commanding officer of 
the National Guard in Gao highlighted that UNMAS assistance 
helped to support stabilization efforts and that a positive impact 
was noticed on the ground. He emphasized that the WAM trainings 
contribute to raising awareness of personnel on the importance of 
applying best practices in order to avoid stockpile diversion and ac-
cidents. Moreover, he stressed the significant impact of implement-
ing rehabilitation projects in rural areas as a positive signal for local 
administrations and populations and a significant contribution to 
stabilization efforts in Mali.  
See endnotes page 66
Marlène Dupouy
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In 2015, the government of Colombia and las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarais de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) invited Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), to develop a joint pilot project to survey and clear anti- personnel mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The project was a first of its kind in terms of the com-
position of the teams: two warring parties working side-by-side, and a means to help build trust and de-escalate 
the conflict during the Colombian peace process. In 2016, NPA commissioned photojournalist Giovanni Diffidenti 
to visit Santa Helena and El Orejón to capture the historic demining project in action. Diffidenti’s photos for NPA 
are featured in this article. 
In 2016, the government of Colombia and FARC-EP reached a peace agreement after four years of negotiations. The 
agreement ended one of the longest armed conflicts in South American history, and Colombian President Juan Manuel 
Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in December 2016. 
More than 50 years of civil war has left Colombia with widespread landmine and ERW contamination. Clearing the 
country of landmines is an important pre-condition for the fulfillment of the peace agreement and a successful tran-
sition into post-conflict Colombia. It is also an obligation under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), to 
which Colombia is a state party and is required to complete landmine clearance by its Article 5 treaty deadline of 
1 March 2021. 
Clearing Landmines and 
Building Peace in Colombia
by Vanessa Finson [ Norwegian People’s Aid ] and Giovanni Diffidenti [ Photographer ]
Two BIDES members walk through an area cleared of landmines in Alto Capitan (2016).
Photo courtesy of Department of Antioquia.
In the SPOTLIGHT:
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DAICMA’s Paulo Lasso conducts MRE in Santa Helena primary school, and shows children a video in which they can see landmines and hear stories 
of landmine survivors (2016).
Photo courtesy of Department of Meta.
Landmines are dispersed throughout an estimated 40 
percent of the national territory. More than 11,000 vic-
tims of landmines have been recorded since 1990.1 Due to 
the conflict, the Colombian population has suffered large-
scale displacement, and the government has registered 
more than 7.2 million internally displaced persons (IDP). 
Demining operations are essential for reducing the fear 
and risk of mine- and ERW-related incidents, and for mak-
ing land available for safe and productive use (e.g., farm-
ing and other livelihoods), promoting development, and 
restoring access to infrastructure and public services. 
NPA led, coordinated, and facilitated the demining pilot 
project from May 2015 to December 2016. The demining 
teams consisted of personnel from both the Government’s 
Demining Engineers Battalion (BIDES) and FARC-EP, ac-
companied by the Colombian National Authority on Mine 
Action, Dirección para la Acción Integral contra Minas 
Antipersonal (DAICMA). Part of NPA’s role in Colombia 
during the peace process was to build trust between the 
parties. NPA organized trust-building activities, such as 
football tournaments and barbeques. BIDES and FARC-EP 
lived under the same roof during the pilot project, which 
meant they got to know one another well and had con-
versations that were not limited to work-related issues. 
The pilot project also encouraged both parties to work 
together to achieve a specific goal: clear landmines that 
endangered the population.
NPA’s role in the successful implementation of the 
pilot project consisted of three elements: a reference 
group comprised of one peace negotiator from the gov-
ernment, one member from FARC-EP, and one NPA rep-
resentative; a steering group with members from all 
three parties; and a management field team in charge of 
implementing the project. 
The geographical areas chosen for clearance opera-
tions were two highly contaminated areas of Colombia 
that had not seen any humanitarian demining previ-
ously. Santa Helena in the Department of Meta is sit-
uated in a flat area with heavy rainforest vegetation. 
Parts of this area were difficult to access because 
the roads were heavily damaged. The other area, El 
Orejon, is situated in the Department of Antioquia. 
It is a mountainous area with rivers and high rainfall, 
and difficult weather conditions frequently stopped 
the operations. Both communities are in need of socio- 
economic development, including the construction of 
roads, and improvements to health services and ed-
ucation. The pilot project contributed by removing 
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Cattle handlers pass next to a minefield in the Gilotambor task area, Santa Helena (2016).
Photo courtesy of Department of Meta.
NPA dog handlers Measho Kidanemariam and Mohamed Beyele Shikuralahi with their mine detec-
tion dogs Rambo and Hamilton, deployed on long leash searching in a minefield in the Filotambor 
area, Santa Helena (2016). 
Photo courtesy of Meta.
landmines, constructing a communi-
ty house, and making improvements 
to a local road and bridge.
During the pilot project, NPA 
found 66 landmines and one item 
of unexploded ordnance (UXO). 
Another essential part of the proj-
ect was to conduct MRE in coordina-
tion with DAICMA. NPA also trained 
four members from different villag-
es who undertook MRE for their own 
communities.  
In a war-torn country where sup-
port for the peace process has 
been low among the civilian pop-
ulation, the trust-building exer-
cise between parties showcased 
positive results, and provided sig-
nificant political and peacebuild-
ing dividends. On 23 June 2016, 
the Colombian government and 
FARC-EP signed a historic bilateral 
ceasefire deal. The two parties for-
mally signed a peace agreement on 
26 September, but the deal was sub-
sequently rejected by a narrow mar-
gin in a referendum on 2 October 
2016. A revised peace accord was 
signed 24 November and ratified by 
Congress from 29 to 30 November 
2016. On 27 June 2017, FARC-EP 
ceased to be an armed group, dis-
armed, and turned over more than 
7,000 weapons to the United Nations 
at a ceremony in Mesetas. 
Following the pilot project, NPA 
obtained full accreditation and reg-
istered as a clearance organization in 
Colombia. In April 2017, NPA started 
its own operations in Vista Hermosa, 
a municipality in the Department of 
Meta. NPA teams have conducted 
non-technical survey and clearance 
in Mesetas, also in the Department 
of Meta. 
NPA is assisting DAICMA and 
FARC-EP in their mine action efforts. 
NPA has provided DAICMA with an 
FARC-EP’s Jefferson Martinez points out to BIDES an area where they might find more landmines 
in the CHIRI 4 minefield task (2016).
Photo courtesy of Department of Antioquia.
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Above: Inside her tent, a light bulb illumi-
nates FARC-EP’s Lilana Castellano and FARC-
EP Commander Alfonso Cano (2016). Castellano 
comes from META, part of the Bloque Oriental 
military group and joined FARC-EP at the age 
of 15. “I entered FARC because I did not have 
the opportunity to study or to work. We don’t 
have any discrimination in our party (of wom-
en, men, black people or whatsoever),” says 
Castellano. She was a commander of a mobile 
campaign. “We always thought of peace since 
the beginning of war. There is lots to do, and I 
will follow the orders of my party.” The party, 
for Castellano, is everything—family, friends—
and gives her a sense of security. She traveled 
to Havana and saw the sea for the first time. 
“The sensation of the sand and the sea under 
my feet … I ran for three [kilometers], a sensa-
tion of freedom.”
Photo courtesy of Department of Meta.
Left: Alejandro Hernandes holds a photo of 
himself with his wife Yudi Garcia and their son 
Miguel Angel Hernandez in El Orejon (2016). 
Yudi died in a landmine accident not far from 
their home—she was 16 years old.
Photo courtesy of Department of Antioquia.
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information-management adviser who will help enhance 
systems and undertake capacity building of the 
information-management team with the national authori-
ties. NPA is also assisting FARC-EP in structuring its 
recently established organization for mine action, 
FARC-EP, BIDES-DAICMA, and members of the local community play football on the  school grounds in El Orejon (2016).
Photo courtesy of Antioquia. 
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Humanicemos. Moreover, NPA collaborates closely with 
the national military humanitarian demining brigade on 
various topics, particularly on the training and accredita-
tion of mine detection dogs in Colombia. 
See endnotes page 66
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Field Notes
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has been operational in improvised explosive device (IED) clearance in Hamdaniya, Iraq, since January 2017. Additionally, 
MAG (Mines Advisory Group) has operated in the same area 
clearing IEDs since September 2015 and has had operations 
in many parts of both Iraq and Syria. Other nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGO) clearing IEDs include Handicap 
International and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action 
(FSD). Without question, IED clearance is now an established 
part of humanitarian mine action (HMA). Yet this does not 
mean HMA should adopt the full spectrum of IED dispos-
al (IEDD) operations. Rather, NGOs can provide invaluable 
capacity only within the appropriate humanitarian context.
IEDs on the Battlefield
IEDs have long been a part of the battlefield mix of explo-
sive hazards, from simple, modified munitions to complex, 
multi-switch devices. In conflicts, these devices are typical-
ly neutralized by specialized military and/or police teams. 
However, not every device is found, so IEDs inevitably end up 
as a part of the explosive contamination left behind after the 
shooting stops. Consequently, HMA actors have a long his-
tory of dealing with booby-trap scenarios involving modified 
munitions, such as in the Balkans, or abandoned IEDs, such 
as in southern Afghanistan. This was generally executed as 
incidental encounters during unexploded ordnance (UXO) or 
mine clearance but not the main effort. However, the battle-
field is evolving, and HMA must grow with it.
The successes of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
(APMBC) and munition stockpile reduction projects have 
limited the availability of these weapons to nonstate actors. 
In the beginning of the insurgency campaigns in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, IEDs tended to use main charges of unexploded pro-
jectiles or other factory-produced ordnance. When the stock 
of munitions ran out, the bomb makers turned to homemade 
explosive (HME) for main charges. By manufacturing HME 
from common precursors such as aluminum, urea, ammo-
nium nitrate, and potassium chlorate, the bombers created a 
nearly inexhaustible supply chain.
IED Proliferation in Iraq and Syria
IED deployment methodologies changed dramatically 
when ISIS broke out of Syria and swept through a massive 
swath of Iraq in 2014. IEDs became a main strategic tool in 
both offense and defense. Using captured factories and ma-
chinery, ISIS began making improvised landmines, rockets, 
mortars, fuses, and grenades—some of which are complete 
one-off designs—while others are surprisingly decent copies 
of state-produced munitions. The sheer scale and variety of 
IED production and deployment is astounding.
Arguably the most popular design with ISIS is the pressure-
plate IED (PPIED). Although it looks nothing like a mine, it 
is commonly deployed with the same tactical intent as a tra-
ditional mine.
The PPIED consists of two plates held apart by spacers. 
When these plates touch from pressure, the circuit is closed, 
firing an electric detonator. The detonator can be commercial 
or also improvised. Certainly this is a very simple yet effec-
tive device. The main charges are made from just about any 
available container from fuel jugs to tea kettles, or they can 
be made by ISIS from industrial pipes, gas cylinders, or other 
Humanitarian Mine Action 
and IEDs
by Craig McInally and Hans Risser [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]
This kerosene heater was modified into an IED that incorporates both a 
crush necklace and a built-in, anti-lift feature. These devices and others 
like them are sitting among the rubble inside abandoned homes await-
ing returning families.
All photos courtesy of NPA.
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repurposed material. Typical net explosive quantity (NEQ) 
ranges from 6 to 20 kg (13 to 44 lbs), although much larger 
charges have been found when targeting vehicles. Secondary 
anti-lift features are common, as are dual pressure plates. If on 
the surface, even a child’s footstep is enough pressure to func-
tion the device. 
Yet the charges are powerful enough to destroy a truck and 
kill the occupants. PPIEDs currently encountered in Iraq are 
generally robust in design and can remain functional for several 
years. Other improvised mines, which mimic factory-produced 
mines in form as well as function, use mechanical cocked- 
striker fuzing, and these may have even longer operational 
lifespans than electronically-fired systems. ISIS deploys these 
improvised mines in long, patterned rows to defend against 
assault from security forces. Command IEDs can be found in-
terspersed at key points inside the protective row as well.  
An anti-personnel mine, as defined by the APMBC and 
the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended 
Protocol II, is “a munition designed to be placed under, on or 
near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by 
the presence, proximity or contact of a person” intended to 
“incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”1,2 The trea-
ty definitions say nothing about the munitions being facto-
ry made, meaning a victim-operated (VOIED) placed on the 
ground or another surface area is an anti-personnel mine un-
der the scope of these definitions, their respective treaties and 
international humanitarian law. 
Another common tactic is to place IEDs inside houses in 
the perimeter of the village and in large defensible structures 
such as schools and hospitals. Some of these IEDs are well dis-
guised as seemingly harmless objects. NPA has encountered 
generators and kerosene heaters repurposed as VOIEDs in 
several houses. The primary switching is small contact beads 
at intervals of fine copper wire, essentially multiple miniature 
pressure plates in a row. The commonly used name for this de-
sign is crush necklace (although many other names are used). 
These crush necklaces can be several meters long and snake 
around doors and stairways. 
The wires are usually enameled or painted to match con-
crete and are hard to see. So far, every device of this category 
that NPA neutralized has also contained at least one second-
ary switch targeting the clearance agent. Crush necklaces are 
also found with other types of main charges. When deployed 
on hard surfaces, the target is personnel, and on soft ground, 
the target is vehicles.
Security forces conducted clearance as they breached 
through, but the quality of the clearance is not to interna-
tional standards and the mapping is nonexistent. The vast 
A typical PPIED with dual pressure plates. The national staff searchers 
have marked it for the IED specialists to prosecute.
The same PPIED after neutralization. Note the square, white electronic 
anti-lift device on the left.
The rubble from an adjacent IED detonation makes the crush necklace 
even harder to see.
31
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 21.3
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017
32 FIELD NOTES @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION
majority of devices remain in situ, especially the massive rows 
of improvised mines. The precise amount of contamination is 
not known, but a reasonable estimate is that over 50 percent 
of communities in the areas liberated from ISIS in Iraq have 
large-scale IED contamination. While the original target was 
security forces, today the victims of these IEDs are the dis-
placed people who are returning home to rebuild their lives. 
Humanitarian Response
The humanitarian crisis created by these IEDs is hard to 
fully comprehend. A massive swath of Iraq and Syria was laid 
waste and booby-trapped. IEDs lurk among the rubble, along 
roads and power lines, inside abandoned houses and govern-
ment buildings, and in agricultural fields.
Some groups within the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
and mine action community have questioned the capability of 
HMA NGOs to clear IEDs. While some of this is an obvious 
ploy to corner the market, the question is nevertheless valid 
and should be discussed openly. Whether NGOs can conduct 
IED clearance effectively has been proven on the ground al-
ready. So perhaps the correct discussion is how and why we 
are operating. The discussion begins by acknowledging two 
crucial differences in NGO capacity versus security forces and 
commercial companies.  
First, HMA NGOs are impartial and not in the fight. 
HMA deployment is non-tactical and engages directly with 
the affected community. The teams are neither intended nor 
equipped to deploy full security cordons or engage defensive-
ly. Deployment is planned in areas far enough away from the 
frontline to reduce the probability of being targeted or being 
caught in an engagement.  
Second, NGOs do not use armor, electronic counter mea-
sures (ECM), fully remote procedures, and security cordons. 
Thus active command or time devices fall outside the scope of 
HMA work. NPA applies a sufficient soak time (period of time 
observed in order to allow active sensors to run down and 
timers to expire) to ensure that any lingering fighters have left 
and that any active timers or power sources have run down. 
The remaining devices are then considered to be abandoned 
IED and fall into the HMA realm. 
But perhaps even more important than how an HMA NGO 
deploys in a C-IED role is why. As defined in International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS), HMA projects “should re-
flect fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality, 
impartiality, equality and humanity so that mine action is fo-
cused on giving support to those who are most vulnerable” 
(IMAS 1.10).2 If operators are going to continue to conduct 
HMA, the real question is which C-IED tasks are appropriate 
for a humanitarian operator. If the clearance task involves an 
IED that is at play within the active battlefield, humanitar-
ian intervention is inappropriate because it would raise ques-
tions regarding the humanitarian principles of neutrality and 
impartiality. This is not specific to an IED context but equal-
ly applies to a classic minefield. A humanitarian mine ac-
tion operator would never enter into a conflict zone to clear 
a minefield that one side of the conflict is actively defending 
or maintaining.
Therefore, if there was ongoing IED deployment or over-
watch in an area, it would be inappropriate for a humanitar-
ian operator to intervene as it could, in legal terms, potentially 
constitute direct participation in the conflict.
The HMA Role in IED Clearance
For HMA, the most appropriate environment for opera-
tions is post-conflict or in a theater where active combat is 
not taking place. This allows HMA to focus on giving support 
to those who are most vulnerable and meeting the needs of 
the civilian population and returnees. Thus, HMA focuses on 
three main types of clearance with respect to IEDs: hazardous 
areas, booby-trapped structures, and spot tasks.
Hazardous areas of VOIEDs are improvised minefields, 
and HMA NGOs are the leading actors in mine clearance and 
its associated survey and information management (IM). By 
adapting current best practices in mine clearance, operators 
can efficiently locate and remove the devices and return the 
resource back to the community. Like traditional mine clear-
ance, most of the effort is expended in identifying the areas 
and searching for the devices.
Unlike traditional mine clearance, the improvised nature of 
the threat requires IEDD-qualified staff to deal with even the 
most apparently simple device. NGOs and commercial com-
panies both employ former military personnel to provide this 
capacity. HMA must be vigilant in keeping improvised mine 
clearance procedures distinct from traditional mine clear-
ance. Like all mine or UXO clearance, the skills of the team 
and equipment required must be adjusted to the threat posed 
by the devices.  
Structure clearance is done solely by IED-qualified staff. 
High Risk Search techniques created by military IED opera-
tors are employed, but the tools and methods are compara-
tively low-tech versus proper military teams. Also, given that 
the intent of HMA is to return land and property back to civil-
ian use, protection of property is even more important with-
in the HMA context, so energetic attacks (disruptors, various 
water explosives, shaped charges, etc.) are less commonly 
used. Buildings are selected based on the resource value to the 
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community. For example, NPA has cleared several homes for 
returnees as well as a large primary school and a large second-
ary school in an area 20 km (12 mi) from Mosul.  
For HMA, the results are all about the human impact, not 
just square meters. Spot tasks have changed as well. Before 
the IED proliferation, an unfired round of ammunition was 
simply picked up and hauled off. Now in countries such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, or Somalia, the same item 
must now be evaluated as a potential come-on or IED com-
ponent. Further, abandoned command or time devices pop up 
as spot tasks here and there. These are essentially then treated 
as VOIED in case of secondary switching (with some excep-
tions such as stuck-fast timer). Of course, drills such as Radio 
Frequency discipline or wire control are still employed—just 
without the worry of an active triggerman or a running timer.
Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses
Security forces, commercial companies, and NGOs each 
have a different role to play in the effort to remove explosive 
hazards. In some cases, NGOs are not suitable at all. In oth-
er cases, NGOs are the best equipped to deliver a solution. In 
fact, NPA proposes that the three sectors of IED response, 
when working together and sharing information, can achieve 
synergy. What is important is to understand our various roles. 
As previously mentioned, NGOs cannot, or at least should 
not, do front-line clearance or active command or time devic-
es. These scenarios are appropriate for security forces and cer-
tain specialized commercial companies.
IED operators take years to develop from scratch, so fast 
response requires a large amount of expat skill sets imported 
to the mission, and commercial companies can more easily 
recruit these operators due to more lucrative compensation. 
NGOs are unlikely to win funding for clearance of private 
commercial property or military bases, whereas commercial 
companies are well suited for these tasks.
Where HMA stands out is in the long grind of survey and 
clearance. HMA developed the land release and toolbox con-
cepts. Land release is a process that coordinates certain types 
of survey with clearance and puts the emphasis on survey over 
clearance in order to get hazard areas released efficiently and 
safely (see IMAS 07.11 for more).  
The toolbox concept is a strategy for utilizing mechanical, 
manual, and animal systems together to optimize quality and 
productivity. Survey of the region and clearance of hazardous 
areas is a slow process even in the best conditions. Time is on 
the side of NGOs. Taking on the large, complex area clearance 
tasks frees up clearance teams from security forces to get back 
in the fight and do what they do best.  
Beyond survey and clearance, HMA activities include risk 
education and community liaison work that have positive in-
direct effects on clearance. NGOs train local teams who, in 
turn, teach local people how to recognize, avoid, and report 
hazards. The obvious benefit is saved lives. But local reporting 
also provides a massive boost in information collection and 
task prioritization. Further, NGOs gain community accep-
tance that can also have security benefits on the ground, par-
ticularly in countries that are suspicious of foreign people and 
organizations.
A row of improvised mines isolated for clearance.
This primary school classroom bears the marking from the HRS clear-
ance process.
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Based on the authors' experience in the commercial and 
HMA sectors, NGOs are far more cost-effective than for-
profit companies. Because NGOs operate at lower costs, and 
because they actively work to build self-sustaining national ca-
pacity, the value per dollar and sustainability are much better. 
However, highly-capitalized commercial companies are more 
agile in initial deployment and redeployment than NGOs. 
Quality management (QM) in HMA and commercial com-
panies is extremely stringent. There are several tiers of internal 
QM, and generally the National Mine Action Authority or the 
United Nations Mine Action Service provides external QM. 
Security forces, on the other hand, do not have the time or re-
sources to devote to clearance at these high standards. 
The final strength of the NGO in this crisis is the value of 
the clearance to the community. NPA’s mandate is to restore 
access, both directly to the people and to aid agencies trying 
to deliver assistance. Other NGOs have similar approaches 
that focus on how the IEDs impact communities in order to 
prioritize assistance with limited resources.
Looking Forward
HMA actors have been clearing improvised devices and 
conducting house clearance of booby traps for years. We 
continue to clear minefields with complex threats including 
anti-lift devices, tripwires, or mixes of UXO, landmines, clus-
ter strikes, and improvised landmines. In each specific task, 
HMA organizations must analyze the threats and adjust their 
training, equipment, and skill set to meet the threat posed by 
the mix of devices in each location. In this sense, dealing with 
IEDs and improvised landmines is nothing new for HMA ac-
tors. What has changed in places like Iraq and Syria is the 
scale of the use of IEDs versus traditional factory-produced 
munitions. Due to the success of the APMBC and government 
efforts to improve physical security and stockpile reduction 
projects, the dwindling supply of anti-personnel landmines 
and professionally-manufactured munitions available to in-
surgent groups appears to be a long-term trend that is here to 
stay. Without the open backing of a foreign government, the 
insurgents’ most likely weapon in the future will continue to 
be improvised devices. 
NPA and other NGOs have clearly demonstrated that 
HMA actors can play a role in IED clearance operations with-
in the appropriate humanitarian context. The question is not 
whether HMA actors can address active command or timed 
devices, but whether it is appropriate given their humanitar-
ian mandate. HMA NGOs can always adjust their capacity to 
respond appropriately to the threat posed by a device. The 
question of where an HMA actor can or cannot operate is not 
determined by the type of device but by the scenario in which 
the device is found in. Once the conflict is over, NGOs can 
move in and devote the months or years needed to return re-
sources back to the communities as part of regaining normal-
cy after war.  
A version of this article first appeared in the Counter-IED 
Report, Autumn 2017.
See endnotes page 66
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Norwegian People’s Aid
Craig McInally is the Operations Manager for 
Norwegian People’s Aid in Northern Iraq. He 
started in the U.S. Army first as infantry, 
then later joined EOD and served as a Team 
Leader. McInally has since been employed 
in both the commercial and humanitarian 
sectors of the explosive ordnance career 
field for the past 17 years in various locations 
including Afghanistan, Colombia, El Salvador, and Libya. He holds 
a bachelor's degree in Management, a master's degree, and is a 
member of the Institute of Explosive Engineers.
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Norwegian People’s Aid
Hans Risser is Global Head of Operations for 
Norwegian People’s Aid and is based in Oslo, 
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United Nations Development Programme 
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Studies from the Monterey Institute for International Studies and a 
bachelor's degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University in 
Washington, D.C.
Beneficiaries of NGO clearance. These children can now return to school 
after more than two years without formal education.
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On 11 November 1918, the Armistice brought an end to the First World War. With the guns falling silent, the armies disbanded and peace once again reigned 
over a European landscape, destroyed through years of 
industrial-scale conflict. The Armistice also heralded the start 
of two significant major operations: the unenviable task of ex-
huming human remains from the battlefields for reburial in 
the hundreds of newly created cemeteries, and the collec-
tion and controlled destruction of the millions of unexploded 
shells that littered the former battlefields.
In 1920, in Flanders, Belgium, a Poelkapelle-based bomb 
disposal company began the task of clearing the unexploded 
ammunition from in and around the former Ypres Salient. 
Initially it was expected that the operation would be completed 
within three years; however, this was not to be the case. In 
2015, from Flanders’ former First World War battlefields, 
DOVO-SEDEE, the Belgian army’s bomb disposal unit, 
collected 173.4 metric tons (191 short tons) of ammunition 
comprising 8,690 projectiles, of which 1,018 included (or 
contained) toxic contents. In 2016, the figure rose to 
Recovering The Past:  
A Photographic Documentary
 Exploring Post-Conflict Reconciliation
DOVO-SEDEE personnel (on the right) wears a biochemical protection suit to handle and dismantle recovered toxic ordnance. Although the gas shells 
are a century old, their contents have lost none of their toxicity. The Australians in this image carry box respirators, essential for survival in trench 
warfare.
Photo courtesy of the author.
by Ian Alderman
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197.7 metric tons (217.9 short tons) of ammunition, comprising 
7,767 projectiles, of which 838 had toxic contents. The bomb 
disposal operation in Flanders continues on a daily basis, a 
century after the last of hundreds of thousands of traumatized 
men left the trenches for the final time to return home.
I am a London-based photographer whose great 
grandfather was shot at the Battle of the Somme in 1916. With 
this family history and the then fast-approaching centenary 
commemorations of the First World War in mind, in 2011 I 
embarked on developing a complex but unique photographic 
project to be entitled Recovering The Past. Since its comple-
tion, Recovering The Past has been exhibited both at the 
United Nations in Geneva and currently as a component of 
the centenary commemorations to the Battle of Passchendaele 
at the In Flanders Fields Museum, in Ypres, Belgium, as part 
of the Total War display.
A strong set of photographs will always be enhanced if ac-
companied by a strong or original narrative. It was whol-
ly probable that a great many projects inspired by the First 
World War were simultaneously under production at that 
time so originality was a critical consideration. Despite a fam-
ily connection, as I indulged my personal interest in the war 
itself, a broader message kept emerging, a message that tran-
scended that particular war and clearly applied to all conflicts 
past, present, and in all likelihood, the future. I decided to fo-
cus my project around the theme of post-conflict reconcilia-
tion. Recovering The Past was subsequently born.
The consequences of war are many, some obvious, others 
less so, and often remain with us for many years. Recovering 
The Past is a project that brings together two separate groups 
of men with origins a century apart, but who are united 
through conflict. Each of the two stories combined within 
We thought we managed alright, kept the awful things out of mind, but now 
I’m an old man and they come out from where I hid them. Every night.
-Jim McPhee from Drouin, Victoria, 
a veteran of the Western Front1
The construction of new buildings or road developments carries a particularly high risk to building contractors. Construction sites in Flanders will oc-
casionally employ civilian-contracted detection companies to identify and manage the inevitable unearthing of unexploded ammunition until its re-
covery by personnel of DOVO-SEDEE. The construction site in this image is in Ypres. Nine Victoria Crosses were awarded to the men of the Australian 
Imperial force for their gallantry in the battles that raged around this town in 1917.
Photo courtesy of the author.
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Crate Number 143 of Great War vintage ammunition awaits its destruction. Recovered from Flanders former battlefields, it is a sobering indication 
of the scale of the problem. Each shell is bar-coded primarily for the purpose of traceability through the complex disposal process. Another advan-
tage of this system is that it allows the creation of a database of all types of ammunition recovered on the battlefield. The chalk circle indicates the 
filling point of the shells’ chemical contents during its manufacture.
Photo courtesy of the author.
The unexploded ammunition’s location will have been given to DOVO-SEDEE for its collection by the local police who will have verified the shell’s ex-
istence beforehand. A first reconnaissance will be made by the police who will provide additional information on the type and size of the unearthed 
ammunition. This facilitates the intervention of the DOVO-SEDEE team. The highest percentage of ammunition recovered originates from farming 
and commercial development.
Photo courtesy of the author.
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An eight-inch British high-explosive shell is recovered from drainage works undertaken in the back garden of a house in modern day Passchendaele. 
For the residents of Flanders, more specifically in the Southwest, such finds are commonplace.
Photo courtesy of the author.
Two members of DOVO-SEDEE’s bomb disposal team carry unexploded ammunition from its point of recovery to their vehicle. Twice a day DOVO-
SEDEE will bury and detonate conventional high-explosive ammunition recovered from around the former Ypres Salient. On average, DOVO-SEDEE 
will destroy circa 100 tonnes of ammunition by closed-earth detonation per year.
Photo courtesy of the author.
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each image symbolically represent a unique consequence of 
human conflict.  
The project’s 25 images are a montage of my own photo-
graphs of the operations of the DOVO-SEDEE bomb disposal 
team, and archival images of men of the Australian Imperial 
Force (AIF). The men of the AIF made significant contribu-
tions to the fighting in many localized battles that collectively 
made up the Third Battle of Ypres.2 Their courageous efforts 
are acknowledged through the images of this project.
An important inspiration came from two prominent 
Australian artists. Captain James Francis “Frank” Hurley 
took powerful images during the Third Battle of Ypres; they 
convey the atrocious fighting conditions endured by those 
who fought in that battle. But for Hurley, individual images 
failed to capture the scale of the event, consequently he pro-
duced several (now famed) composite images from his own 
negatives, which portray the battle as he himself saw it. “It 
is impossible to secure full effects of this bloody war without 
composite pictures. It’s unfair to our soldiers,” wrote Hurley.3
Australian artist Will Longstaff produced the celebrat-
ed painting ‘Menin Gate at Midnight’ after attending the 
gate’s official opening in July 1927. Situated in Ypres, the gate 
bears the names of 54,896 men whose remains have nev-
er been found. Longstaff’s painting depicts the spirits of the 
Australian dead rising from the ground. 
In adopting both Hurley’s use of 
composite imagery and Longstaff’s ar-
tistic depiction of soldiers, the artistic 
inspiration of Recovering The Past is 
based on elements of Australia’s artistic 
and cultural heritage. 
Having secured the necessary autho-
rizations from DOVO-SEDEE in 2011 to 
embark on this project, I made frequent 
trips to Flanders over a period of sever-
al years to produce the project’s master 
images. I accompanied the personnel 
of DOVO-SEDEE on over one hun-
dred call-outs to recover ammunition 
unearthed by members of the public 
in their gardens, and more commonly 
from farming or construction activities.
Months of experimental preproduc-
tion work were spent developing a work-
flow that enabled me to produce the photographs I needed of 
DOVO-SEDEE’s operations so that cohesive montages could 
be later produced. Once embedded with the bomb disposal 
team, it was crucial that I could take the required photographs 
in as short a time as possible at multiple locations, while caus-
ing minimal disruptions to the bomb disposal operations.
The technical challenges to be solved with produc-
ing Recovering The Past were many and often frustrating. 
Attempting seamless integration of an old image into new 
soon proved unsatisfactory. It became apparent that the only 
way to sensitively combine such images was to integrate the 
new around the old. The photographic data inherent in the ar-
chival component can be matched or reproduced within a new 
image; it is not possible to do the reverse. Camera height, cam-
era angle, direction of light—all highly significant technical 
considerations can be established from analyzing an archival 
picture. This crucial data must be matched and ultimately in-
corporated into the new photograph while on location and all 
in a space of a few minutes. Patience proved essential.
The integration of the Australian men in the images is not 
merely one of technical correctness; it is critical to generate an 
all-important emotional connection, too. They must be made 
to engage with either an event in the contemporary photo-
graph or with the viewer themselves. Achieving this was the 
most challenging aspect of the production phase. 
The final image of "Recovering the Past" sees the project’s narrative reversed; as such it is a 
powerful statement of what lies ahead. Unexploded ammunition is not a problem unique to the 
former battlefields of The Great War. All conflicts since, and those to come, will leave a similar 
tangible and lethal legacy for future generations to confront. "Recovering the Past" encourages 
its viewer to consider this troubling consequence of human conflict and stands as an opportunity 
on which it can be debated.
Photo courtesy of the author.
It is impossible to secure full effects of this bloody war 
without composite pictures. It’s unfair to our soldiers.
-Captain Francis Hurley3
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Photographer Ian Alderman reviews the images of “Recovering the Past” with Belgium’s HRH Princess Astrid and Vice Prime Minister Didier Reynders 
at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, in December 2015.
Photo courtesy of Jean-Pol Schrauwen.
Britain’s Prime Minister, Theresa May, on her recent visit to the current exhibition of "Recovering the Past" with the photographer, Ian Alderman, 
and assistant curator Dominiek Dendooven, at the In Flanders Field Museum in Belgium.
Photo courtesy of U.K. Ministry of Defence.
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The archival components of the photographs are all high-
resolution digital scans of the original priceless, glass plate 
negatives, supplied for this project by the National Archives 
of Australia. Working with these scans was one of the privi-
leges of this project. The image quality and sharpness of those 
glass plate scans can still challenge the digital files produced 
by a modern digital camera.
Its timely relevance notwithstanding, Recovering The Past 
stands alone in allowing the viewer to contemplate the con-
sequence to society of the long-term legacies of conflict. The 
philosophy of the entire project is brought to a conclusion in 
the final image, which reverses the project’s narrative to show 
an inevitable future consequence of war.
Recovering The Past has significant educational value and 
can engage its younger viewers simultaneously in art, history, 
and digital manipulation techniques. It also suggests to view-
ers that it is possible to engage with history using modern dig-
ital technology alongside the more traditional methods. 
See endnotes page 67
Ian Alderman
Photographer
London, UK
Commercial website: www.ianalderman.com
Project website: www.recoveringthepast.com
Ian Alderman discovered and subsequently developed his pas-
sion for photography through a desire to capture the drama of the 
great outdoors. On graduating from the Blackpool and The Flyde 
photography course in 1992, Alderman worked predominantly in 
assisting and production roles within the corporate and advertis-
ing photography genre. Subsequent and extensive work as both a 
photographer and location scout have given him a broad background 
from which to produce projects such as “Recovering The Past.”
A complex project, over five years in the making, “Recovering The 
Past” has been produced with the commemorations of the First 
World War at its heart. With his great grandfather himself a ca-
sualty of the tragic conflict, this project represents his personal 
tribute to his great grandfather and all of those who lived, fought, 
and died in circumstances and conditions we simply cannot imag-
ine today.
Photographer Ian Alderman.
Photo courtesy of the author.
The current exhibition of Recovering The Past at the In 
Flanders Fields Museum, Ypres, is open to the public from 
3 June 2017 through 31 December 2017. For more information, 
please see: http://www.flandersfields.be/en/1917/flanders-fields-
museum.
The author retains copyright of all images published.
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Field Notes
Adopted by all U.N. Member States in September 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDG) entered into effect on 1 January 2016 to guide develop-
ment efforts.1 The SDGs are in the early stages of implementa-
tion and are still being mainstreamed into mine action. This 
article draws on a timely study from the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that aims to stim-
ulate collective thinking in the sector, provides policy recom-
mendations, and offers implementation tools.2 
From Global to National: The Sustainable 
Development Landscape
The 2030 Agenda envisions development to be sustainable—
i.e., balancing economic development, social equity, and envi-
ronmental protection. Sustainable development is viewed as 
being participatory, inclusive, and nondiscriminatory so that 
“no one is left behind,” particularly the most vulnerable and 
marginalized in society.1 
The 17 SDGs, subdivided into 169 global targets and 230 
indicators, serve as the 2030 Agenda’s results and report-
ing framework. The SDGs (and their targets) are indivisible 
and linked together in response to the interconnectedness 
of the challenges of our time.3,4,5 They need to be tailored to 
national contexts, needs, and priorities through a national 
SDG framework. 
Preparing for the Future: 
How the SDGs Impact Mine Action
by Ursign Hofmann [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ] and 
Olaf Juergensen [ United Nations Development Programme ]
National Mine Action Authorities 
(NMAA) have a major role to play at 
the intersection between global poli-
cy shifts and national/local level real-
ties. Whereas the SDGs are of a global 
nature, more country-specific areas of 
work, such as mine action, are not ex-
plicitly identified but rather anticipated 
to be addressed via national SDG frame-
works. These nationalization processes 
are unique opportunities for NMAAs to 
mainstream mine action and ensure ap-
propriate entry points (e.g., at the level of 
goals, targets, and indicators). 
Several countries affected by landmines and explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW) have taken first steps in that direction. 
In Afghanistan, the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination 
(DMAC), with support of the United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS), successfully voiced the importance of mine 
action with the Ministry of Planning, in charge of designing 
the national SDG framework, and was tasked to propose mine 
action indicators. The governments of Cambodia and Lao PDR 
decided to formulate a national SDG 18 to address the negative 
development impacts of contamination and to assist victims. 
The 2030 Agenda: A Game Changer
National SDG frameworks will form the basis for nation-
al development efforts, sectoral plans, and country-specific 
U.N. development frameworks. The SDGs are also expected 
to serve as the reference for development policies and financ-
ing.5 Mine action is guided by treaty implementation, human-
itarian imperatives, human rights approaches, and now the 
SDGs, which overarch, connect, and reinforce these different 
frameworks. Consequently, many mine action organizations, 
NMAAs, and donors are trying to adapt to this new policy 
and programming environment while aligning their strate-
gies with the SDGs. 
The 2030 Agenda is seen as a ‘game-changer’ in that it 
Figure 1. The Sustainable Development Goals.
Figure courtesy of the United Nations.
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calls for the global community to go beyond business as 
usual in planning, delivery, monitoring, and reporting. 
Naturally, several how questions arise for the mine action 
sector, for example 
* How can we better articulate the catalytic contribution 
of mine action to sustainable development and ensure 
more coherence with broader development priorities? 
* How can we strengthen our outcomes and indicators to 
report against broader frameworks? 
* How can we improve participation of and inclusiveness 
for those at risk of being left behind? 
* How can we diversify and innovate our financing?
Mine Action Contributions to Sustainable 
Development in the SDG Era
As national and sectoral development plans are now ex-
pected to be underpinned by the SDG framework, any con-
tribution by mine action interventions to these plans—and 
sustainable development at large—may only be fully recog-
nized if mine action stakeholders can articulate and docu-
ment how they contribute to the achievement of SDG targets. 
It is therefore pivotal to understand how mine action ac-
tivities can accelerate progress across the SDGs and how the 
latter may form part of a mine action Theory of Change. A 
2017 study carried out by the GICHD and UNDP revealed 
that twelve SDGs are, in one way or another, of direct rele-
vance to mine action.2 Furthermore, mine action is positioned 
to contribute to the attainment of four other SDGs indirectly 
(see Figure 2). Across the SDGs, mine action can contribute to 
more than 50 SDG targets. 
SDG 16 provides the most direct entry point, especially 
its target 16.1 that seeks to “significantly reduce all forms 
of violence and related death rates everywhere.” The re- 
establishment of safe physical living environments is, how-
ever, not only an objective in itself, but also an enabling pre-
condition that makes possible and accelerates many other 
development activities. 
Analyzing links helps to identify expected and unexpected 
SDG contributions of mine action activities. It also widens 
the perspective on the impact of mine action’s work on sus-
tainable development. For instance, the strong SDG focus on 
vulnerability and social protection provides a new pathway 
to address the rights of indirect mine/ERW victims through 
broader efforts. More importantly, data will be critical to val-
idate or invalidate these links; an area that both the GICHD 
and UNDP are working on through their support to mine- 
and ERW-affected countries. 
More Coherence Between Mine Action and 
Sustainable Development
It is a demanding task to operationalize the conceptu-
al connections with sustainable development in mine action 
planning, implementation, and reporting. Only by further 
breaking down the remaining silos between sectors will more 
coherent and integrated policies and programs be achieved. 
For mine action to obtain greater results in planning and de-
livery, it will need to strive to be better aligned with broader 
national SDGs, especially as the implementation of the 2030 
Agenda gains traction at the country level. 
The SDG framework makes it possible to deliberately plot 
and record mine action interactions with broader sustainable 
development sectors such as agriculture, education, natu-
ral resource extraction, and tourism. This will help to facil-
itate mine action mainstreaming into budgets, planning, 
implementation, and monitoring within these other sectors. 
Moreover, the framework provides more coherence and coor-
dination that will potentially influence mine action priority 
setting and decision making. 
For this to happen, it is important to communicate with key 
government and local community stakeholders on the role 
that mine action can play in contributing to the SDGs, par-
ticularly when engaging with practitioners who rely on mine 
action as an enabling activity for their humanitarian and de-
velopment work. Their increased awareness can open new 
doors for cross-sectoral partnerships that are at the core of 
SDG implementation. 
Measuring Mine Action Results Version 2030
Many mine action stakeholders have made signifi-
cant achievements toward reporting changes in lives and 
Then U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Prime Minister of Lao 
PDR, Tongloun Sisoulith, at the launching of SDG 18 (September 2016).
Photo courtesy of the United Nations and Eskinder Debebe.
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livelihoods.6,7,8 However, more evidence is needed to demon-
strate exactly how mine action is catalytic at scale. To date, 
indicator development, monitoring, and reporting have often 
been comparatively weak links in project management and 
implementation. 
Therefore, standardizing and aligning mine action out-
comes with global, national, or sectoral reference targets and 
indicators will be critical to positioning mine action within 
broader development planning at many levels.9 Furthermore, 
information management systems can be refitted and better 
connected to feed into national SDG data collection mecha-
nisms that are at the heart of SDG reporting. Figure 3 provides 
an example of possible SDG-aligned mine action outcomes 
and associated indicators related to SDG 4 and SDG 16. 
New Impetus for Participatory and Inclusive 
Mine Action
Mine action often finds itself at the forefront of efforts to 
help marginalized and shattered communities rebuild their 
lives. Differences and inequalities between women and men, 
and amongst social groups can, however, lead to mine ac-
tion dividends not always benefitting all members of society 
equally.10 
Precisely, the SDGs put those at risk of being marginalized 
at the center of interventions. This provides an opening for the 
mine action sector to place a renewed, deliberate emphasis on 
participation and inclusiveness. Strategic planning processes, 
priority setting, definition of success indicators, and data col-
lection/disaggregation are some areas that lend themselves 
particularly well to learn who are and are not benefitting, to 
increase community involvement, and to strengthen account-
ability to those we serve. 
Fresh Pathway for Mine Action Financing and 
Innovation
Mine action funding decreased each year from 2012 to 2015.11 
At the same time, development funding is expected to become 
increasingly tied to SDG implementation. Positioning itself to 
benefit from this SDG-earmarked funding will demand that 
Figure 2: Major direct and indirect links between the SDGs and mine action.
Photo courtesy of GICHD and UNDP.
Figure 3: Illustrative SDG-aligned mine action outcomes and indicators.
Figure courtesy of GICHD and UNDP.
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mine action is able to clearly demonstrate the development 
outcomes of its work. The SDGs offer an innovative pathway 
to do so, whereby the sector becomes more relevant to non- 
traditional public funding streams. What is more, the SDGs 
also provide a shared narrative to engage with new actors, such 
as the private sector or philanthropic organizations, which are 
expected to step up their role in SDG implementation.12 
Seiz ing the Opportunity
The 2030 Agenda offers an important opportunity for mine 
action at this critical juncture in its 20-year history. It is a 
pathway to heighten mine action’s relevance to and main-
streaming into broader sustainable development, while 
strengthening participation, inclusiveness, and accountabili-
ty. Demonstrably aligning mine action with the SDGs can 
help re-energize and boost partnerships with the broader 
peace and development communities, increasing mine ac-
tion’s overall impact and its contribution to reaching the 2030 
Agenda’s pledge to “ensuring no one is left behind.” 
See endnotes page 67
Previously mine-contaminated land becoming a rice field, Cambodia.
Photo courtesy of UNDP, Cambodia.
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Field Notes
With the growing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) within humanitarian mine action (HMA), the need for standardized training is becoming in-
creasingly important to mitigate factors that may otherwise 
inhibit their wider use. The first formal training course for 
people in HMA to qualify as small unmanned aircraft (SUA) 
pilots served as an opportunity to pursue this goal and was 
held at the MAT Kosovo training centre in September 2017.1 
The instructors were from a U.K. company training to U.K. 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) standards for commercial 
SUA pilots.2,3 Although drone and UAV are popular terms 
to describe all umanned aircraft, the term SUA is used by 
some civil aviation authorities to describe specifically light- 
weight models.4,5 
Those in attendance included trainees from across the HMA 
sector: field workers from Libya and Syria, dog handlers, serv-
ing soldiers, and researchers. One trainee was a qualified explo-
sive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician and also a software 
developer who attended in order to benefit interdisciplinary re-
search. Some students had extensive flying experience, while 
others had none, but all learned a great deal from the profes-
sional instructors over five intense days that included many 
testing flights. 
The course was offered because national and supranation-
al civil aviation authorities around the world are increasingly 
controlling the use of unmanned aircraft of all sizes and re-
quire pilots to have demonstrated proficiency.6 The main driv-
ers behind this are air safety, privacy, and security concerns; 
these same concerns also apply in HMA. During the train-
ing, many who attended helped contribute to the first, gener-
ic SUA standard operating procedures (SOP) for HMA, which 
the author was there to draft.7 The SOP is intended to ensure 
Using Small Unmanned 
Aircraft (SUA) in HMA
by Andy Smith [ University of Genoa ]
that safety, privacy, and security concerns are addressed in ways 
that give national mine action authorities the confidence to au-
thorize the controlled use of SUA in HMA. 
Safety, Privacy, and Security
The uncontrolled use of any unmanned aircraft raises safe-
ty, privacy, and security concerns in every country. Civilians 
wanting to use unmanned aircraft commercially in the United 
Kingdom must be registered with the CAA and demonstrate 
an appropriate level of training for the category of aircraft that 
they will fly. Remote pilot certification is granted for a category 
of aircraft and a maximum take-off weight.   
Safety. Wherever HMA operators work, concerns about air-
craft safety—terrestrial and in the air—can be addressed via 
the imposition of best practice pilot training requirements and 
aircraft deployment rules that are imposed by the relevant civ-
il aviation authorities. However, when the relevant national 
Image 1. Taken from a quadcopter, this photograph shows the people at-
tending the training course in Kosovo. 
Image courtesy of Training Solutions - Unmanned Aviation Services.
Images 2–4. Training took place in the classroom, on simulators, and in the air with a range of SUA.  
Images courtesy of the author.
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authority is inoperative or has yet to publish requirements, the 
adoption of those published by internationally respected civ-
il aviation authorities can be the next best option for anyone 
concerned with showing that they have done everything pos-
sible to manage risk. 
Privacy. While privacy concerns may be covered in rele-
vant civil aviation authority flight restrictions, HMA opera-
tors should also respect the concerns of the people in the flight 
path, particularly when flying with a downward facing cam-
era. Ignoring local concerns about personal privacy can be a 
risk to both the aircraft and its pilot, so good community liai-
son and response is usually required in HMA.
Security. Broader than the invasion of privacy involved in 
camera overflights, security concerns involve even the small-
est category of unmanned aircraft, the SUA, which can be 
readily adapted for weapon delivery. In Syria, for example, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has manufactured many 
SUA for uses ranging from combat reconnaissance to flying an 
explosive payload directly into a target. Notably, ISIS has pur-
chased commercially available SUA, overcome their software 
restrictions, and adapted them to carry and release bombs. 
Security concerns are legitimate and the weaponizing of SUA 
is a concern that must be recognized, respected, and answered 
by those using SUA as tools in HMA, especially in regions 
where combat may be ongoing.
Image 5. Part of an ISIS, fixed-wing-SUA factory after its capture in 
2017.
Image courtesy of Conflict Armament Research at http://www.confictarm.com.
Images 6–8. This commercially available SUA has been adapted to carry and re-
lease the small multi-purpose bombs shown. The bombs were manufactured in an 
ISIS factory.
Images courtesy of Conflict Armament Research at http://www.confictarm.com.8
HMA Experience with SUA
Despite the fact that the concept of eye in the sky has yet to 
be fully explored, it is no surprise that the pilot training course 
hosted by MAT Kosovo was well attended because the utili-
ty of SUA in HMA has already been proven. From the early 
iterations of the large Schiebel Camcopter to today’s battery 
powered SUA, there have always been obvious advantages in 
gaining a low-altitude overview of the working area.9 Aerial 
imagery is widely used in HMA. Image 9 is a screenshot show-
ing destroyed ammunition storage bunkers at the Waddan 
weapons storage site in Libya made in 2012. Even high-level 
images like this were a great help when trying to assess the ex-
tent of the problem faced at that time.10 The resolution in Image 
8 is low, does not show the target from all angles, and is not as 
up-to-date as an image recorded minutes ago. 
Some international nongovernmental organizations (INGO) 
have used commercially available SUA when identifying high-
risk areas and planning deployments for years. Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA), for example, reported on the use of a 
commercial quadcopter camera system in Iraq during 2014. 
The SUA was used for basic task planning and to closely 
inspect possible hazards during pre-deployment survey. Since 
the pictures in image 9 were taken, automatic mapping systems 
and support software have improved dramatically, and the list 
of potential uses has grown. 
SUA Utility for HMA
During the pilot training at MAT Kosovo, participants 
compiled the following list of ten generic uses for SUA with-
in HMA:
1 . Close visual inspection.
2. Inspecting vehicles. 
3. Mapping.
4. Non-technical survey.
5. Placing disruption/demolition systems.
6. Placing lightweight hook and line equipment.
7. Pre-deployment survey. (continued on page 48)
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8. Progress mapping, quality assurance, and quality 
control.
9. Training and testing.
1 0. Visual survey in building interiors.
Achieving everything on this list would require developing 
SUA technology so that it is able to perform the same tasks 
as small EOD robots. Also, SUA would need to be capable of 
making detailed, interior-camera surveys without retaining 
line of sight (autonomously or by control signal enhancement). 
However, while many of the uses would benefit from technical 
developments and/or software add-ons, it is apparent that all 
have immediate potential. 
Apart from conventional and infrared cameras, no com-
plete, functional mine-detection systems for small SUA have 
been proven in the field. The ability to detect near-surface or 
hard-to-discriminate targets by enhanced analysis of visual 
imagery and/or the use of hyperspectral and thermal sensors 
may prove valuable, but their use parameters have not yet been 
defined. Moreover, it is unclear whether the existing technol-
ogy can be made reliable enough for humanitarian use.
Other unexplored examples worth pursing include using a 
SUA camera to monitor explosive detection dogs during com-
plex searches or in regular oversight during manual or me-
chanical deployments. Whenever an operative is obliged to 
work entirely alone, an SUA could provide extra information 
and allow the operative to receive informed, remote advice or 
oversight. During demolitions in which the author was recent-
ly involved, using a SUA to inspect the outcome proved use-
ful, often saving time with no reduction in safety. It is probable 
that the controlled use of SUA during demolitions will quickly 
become routine.
A Cautionary Endnote
There has not been a new technology so useful to HMA since 
the development of ground compensating metal detectors. 
Image 9. Screenshot of destroyed ammunition storage bunkers at the 
Waddan weapons storage site, Libya.
Image courtesy of GoogleEarth.
Image 10. Quadcopter photo of Iraq in 2014.
Image courtesy of Ed Rowe, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Iraq 2014.11
Better still, as well as increasing efficiency, the effective use of 
SUA should have immediate safety advantages by increasing 
the information available to the operative. However, as with all 
new tools and procedures, the industry must not ask too much 
of the technology. Safety in HMA is primarily about the safety 
of the people who will use the land. An absence of visible haz-
ards cannot prove that there are no hazards present, so the 
temptation to release land based on evidence from a camera 
overflight alone must be avoided. 
See endnotes page 67
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Image 11. Screenshot from a video captured by an SUA overflying de-
molitions.
Image courtesy of John Fardoulis.12
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Refining Explosive 
Safety Outreach
by Geoff Carton [ CALIBRE Systems, Inc. ] and  
Laura Grindstaff [ Bristol Site Contractors, LLC ]
E xplosives safety awareness programs must identify the target audience and communicate easily under-stood concepts. To be effective, an audience must ap-
ply the concepts presented; however, this is not enough. The 
program and its message must also be adaptable to a variety of 
audiences based on how they assimilate information. The U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) has at least 100 years of safety 
education experience. Over this time, explosives safety mes-
sages underwent several evolutions.
Early DoD efforts focused on munitions that soldiers 
brought home as war trophies and that souvenir hunters re-
covered from military sites. News articles post-World War I 
and II discouraged people from collecting munitions by us-
ing graphic descriptions of explosive safety risks involved in 
handling munitions. The target audience post-World War II 
broadened to incorporate communities near military instal-
lations, including installations that were used for war-time 
training but had returned to public use. News articles post-
World War II describe an intensive DoD program to remove 
munitions from lands once used for live-fire training and 
testing. They also informed the public of hazards associated 
with collecting scrap metal and souvenirs from these areas. 
The effectiveness of the munitions removal effort was lim-
ited by the then-current technology and at many sites only a 
surface clearance was completed.
Despite DoD efforts to communicate explosives safety mes-
sages, injuries to soldiers and civilians of every age continued. 
DoD began to examine the further cleanup of munitions sites 
circa 1983 after a detonation killed two children playing with 
a munition they encountered near their home. When DoD’s 
Defense Environmental Restoration Program was established 
in 1986, its main goal was preventing hazardous chemical 
contamination, but efforts to detect and dispose of unexplod-
ed ordnance, which endangers soldiers and civilians alike, be-
came more organized. Munitions kept as souvenirs, collected 
for their historical value, or simply disturbed by human con-
tact on military ranges have also injured or killed a number of 
adults. These incidents and differing audiences led DoD to de-
velop a variety of safety materials based on the program and 
funding rather than consistent message.
In 2000, an explosive 
incident that involved 
trespassing on an active 
range and the removal of 
munitions killed one teenager and injured another. This led 
the U.S. Army to review DoD explosives safety messages and 
programs. The review found that DoD military services had 
different messages. Some focused on soldiers, while others 
focused on the public or specific risks (e.g., former ranges, 
souvenirs). While well intentioned, the differing materials di-
luted their effectiveness. This led the Army to develop a core 
message: the 3Rs (Recognize, Retreat, Report) that focus-
es on dangers munitions pose and encourages safe behavior 
should a munition or suspect munition be encountered. The 
objective was to create a safety message simple enough to be 
understood by all ages but broad enough to address a variety 
of audiences (e.g., souvenir collectors, construction workers) 
and activities (e.g., outdoor recreation, divers).
With input from focus groups that included risk communi-
cators, explosives safety professionals, parents, and educators, 
the Army crafted the 3Rs as its core explosives safety message. 
The Army developed educational materials including safety 
guides, briefings, signs, and explosives safety presentations 
around this core message. The goals of the 3Rs Explosives 
Safety Education Program are to:
* Provide a simple, consistent, and easily remembered 
message;
* Eliminate redundant efforts and contradictory messages; 
and
* Develop 3Rs Program educational material to be  
* General enough to apply to a variety of audiences and 
activities; or
* Tailored to specific audiences (e.g., children), activities 
(e.g., fishing, construction), or communities (e.g., ci-
vilians, military families).
After 2000, the 3Rs Program became DoD’s basis for in-
forming the public of dangers associated with encountering 
munitions and avoiding injury. A 2011 study of munitions-
related incidents on properties no longer under DoD control 
determined that munitions were intentionally disturbed in at 
The 3Rs.mil home page. A variety of materials 
and activities for differing audiences are avail-
able from the website.
Photo courtesy of CALIBRE Systems, Inc.
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least 20 of the 24 incidents and exposed on the surface in ev-
ery case. In addition, the majority of the individuals injured 
or killed were male. As a result, the Army increased the fo-
cus of its 3Rs Program for at-risk populations (e.g., children, 
particularly boys because over half of the fatalities were chil-
dren and 90 percent of the children were boys) and behaviors 
(e.g., moving or disturbing munitions). The Army then initi-
ated an independent assessment to evaluate the effectiveness 
of 3Rs Program materials. Rather than employing a tradition-
al questionnaire or survey, the assessment consisted of nearly 
100 one-on-one dialogues with children ages 9–12 at schools 
near former military installations that represented a variety of 
communities and cultures.
The assessment indicated that participants exhibited an 
understanding that munitions were dangerous, and civilians 
should not move or disturb them. However, it also identified 
knowledge gaps and unintended responses for important de-
tails of the 3Rs message. Some of the knowledge gaps indicated 
student confusion regarding the use of different terms and ex-
planations for munitions-related concepts. Presentations in-
troduced munitions-related vocabulary that students needed 
to learn to fully understand the core message. The assessment 
indicated that most students could not understand every con-
cept presented during a one-time presentation. Additionally, 
the result was a muddled understanding of how dangerous 
munitions could be and confusion about the meanings of re-
treat and report.
The evaluation indicated that some of the 3Rs methods 
used to communicate its message (e.g., classroom, printed 
media) were more effective for certain audiences. An individ-
ual visiting an area where munitions are present could benefit 
from receiving a pamphlet about the potential hazard and ap-
propriate safety behaviors, while people living and working 
in communities near sites with munitions benefit most by at-
tending a 3Rs presentation where they can ask questions. In 
military families, children are likely to complete 3Rs coloring 
books with their parents, benefiting the entire family. Finally, 
soldiers who already understand the dangers associated with 
munitions may be more effectively influenced by public ser-
vice announcements focusing on their professional respon-
sibilities and the potential danger that munitions present to 
their families.
Refinements the Army made to the 3Rs Program since 
2011 have focused on recognizing the dangers associated with 
munitions over understanding munitions-related concepts. 
These refinements also better emphasize safe behaviors over 
other responses (e.g., curiosity) or reactions (e.g., the desire 
to identify the item, the instinct to pick up an item) when a 
munition or suspect munition is encountered. The Army’s 
message evolved to be more uniform:
* Recognize when you may have encountered a munition 
and that munitions are dangerous.
* Retreat, do not approach, touch, move or disturb it, but 
carefully leave the area.
* Report the munition to local law enforcement and advise 
them of what you saw and where you saw it.
In 2015, the Army redesigned its 3Rs Program website 
(http://3Rs.mil) making it easier to use, accessible to mo-
bile devices, and better at conveying the danger associated 
with munitions and safe behaviors for given audiences (e.g., 
children, teens, adults).1 A variety of 3Rs Program materi-
als including files for printing, videos, and presentations are 
available from the redesigned 3Rs website. Its new design al-
lows for easier navigation to content appropriate for a variety 
of groups: children and families, military and their families, 
community, and workers. 
The Army’s 3Rs Program is now generally accepted as 
DoD’s 3Rs Program. To remain effective, DoD 3Rs Program 
must continue to evolve and adapt. 
See endnotes page 66
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The Collaborative ORDnance Data 
Repository (CORD): 2018 Upgrades
by Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ] and Erik de Brun [ Ripple Design ]
The Collaborative ORDnance Data Repository (CORD) has been in existence since 2015. 
It is a database of over 5,000 entries de-
tailing a wide range of explosive ord-
nance. The database is used extensively 
as a means of identifying munitions by 
those working in the field of humani-
tarian mine action, but also by others. 
Users range from mine clearance op-
erators in Sri Lanka, police bomb dis-
posal teams in Florida or Abu Dhabi, 
human rights advocates in Washington, 
D.C., to journalists in London. CORD 
is not intended as a detailed database. It 
is intended as a simple online ordnance 
identification guide with limited detail, 
accessible to all. 
CORD grew out of the old ORDATA 
database formerly hosted on the web-
site of the Center for International 
Stabilization and Recovery (CISR) at 
James Madison University. This was a 
U.S. Government database of mines and 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) re-
leased in 1997 to assist humanitarian 
demining work. CORD was developed 
as an improved user interface for those 
seeking to search more than 5,000 en-
tries in ORDATA. 
In early 2017 it was determined that 
an upgrade of the CORD system would 
be desirable. The initial system architec-
ture, which was based on an ontology, 
was designed to maximize interopera-
bility with external databases and enable 
future integration of a complex, se-
mantic search system. An ontology is a 
Figure 1. The revised CORD user interface showing the updated list of 18 Ordnance Types (often 
known as Ordnance Categories). In time, further Ordnance Types may be added.
All graphics courtesy of GICHD/CISR.
Figure 2. The revised CORD user interface showing the card view of entries, in this case for one 
of the new Ordnance Type listed in CORD, Submunitions.
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type of database where the data is stored using the Resource 
Description Framework (RDF) data model in the form of 
subject–predicate–object expressions, known as triples. This 
type of database allows for interoperability with other ontolo-
gies without the need for lots of additional development. After 
two years it became clear that interoperability opportuni-
ties were limited (and potentially problematic), and a seman-
tic search capability was not required. At the same time that 
the main benefits of the ontology were not being realized, the 
drawbacks of such architecture were becoming increasingly 
problematic. It was clear that the ontology severely limited the 
search performance of CORD (i.e., its speed and reliability). 
This was noted both internally and through feedback from site 
users. In addition, it became clear that data quality was a real 
issue and some of the specifications and imagery required up-
dating. For example, numerous items had incorrect values for 
explosive content. Moreover, some of the information within 
what should only ever be an ordnance identification guide was 
inappropriate. This included neutralization and disposal op-
tions for ordnance alongside recommendations for transport. 
Information such as this should only be made available to pro-
fessional explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators and 
should not be detailed in a basic free online database.
The task of revising CORD started in February 2017. The 
GICHD signed a memorandum of understanding with CISR 
confirming joint ownership of the database, where GICHD as-
sumed operational control including day-to-day maintenance 
and development responsibilities. GICHD proceeded to revise 
the database architecture and page structure prior to com-
mencing ongoing efforts to check specifications and add im-
proved imagery to entries.
Given the requirements of CORD, it was clear that a rela-
tional database was most appropriate for the relatively sim-
ple dataset of just over 5,000 entries. A relational database 
stores data as relations in tabular form, i.e., as a collection of 
tables with each table consisting of a set of rows and columns. 
Perhaps the majority of relatively small databases in wide-
spread use today are based on the relational database model. 
These tend to be simpler and easier to adapt to changing needs 
over time. A relational database would make it more difficult 
to integrate with external ontologies; however, opportunities 
were limited in this area, and in any case it was clear that this 
was no longer a significant consideration. Moreover, even if 
other external ontologies could be accessed, it was not clear 
how the information extracted would be checked for quality 
prior to being integrated into CORD. Unfortunately, errors 
do exist in even the better ordnance databases. The improve-
ment in the performance of the search functions and the site 
in general, that would come with using a relational database, 
were immediately apparent. The switch improved stability of 
the system because workarounds that had been put in place to 
help improve the ontology performance could be eliminated.
Figure 3. The revised CORD entry layout for the BLU-26 submunition. Note 
the new Associated Evidence section detailing the fragmentation found 
from such a submunition. Such fragmentation can be important evidence 
for those conducting survey or clearance. Also note the new Useful Links 
section detailing links to other relevant websites.
Change from Ontology to Relational 
 Database
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New Features in CORD
Aside from changing to a relational database, a number of 
new features were added to CORD. These include:
* A What’s New section gives users easy access to the 
items most recently updated.
* Ordnance items can now be sorted allowing ordnance 
records to be viewed in multiple ways (card or list view) 
and sorted by name or date added/modified. A button in 
the top right of the user interface screen was added to al-
low items to be shown in chronological order.
* A number of new fields and field types were added to 
the database, including an Associated Evidence sec-
tion detailing evidence associated with particular mu-
nitions, such as packaging or fragmentation. This can 
be particularly useful for entries such as AP Mines, 
AV Mines, and Submunitions. A Useful Links sec-
tion was also added, identifying good technical websites 
with further information on a given item of ordnance: 
e.g., Submunition and Cluster or Dispenser entries 
might have a link to the GICHD Cluster Munition 
Identification Tool (CMID). 
* Improvements to backend data editing and entry of 
CORD were made, allowing features such as captions 
for individual images as well as editing capabilities for 
new fields. The systems that record all changes to CORD 
were also improved.
* A series of analytics dashboards were added to provide 
insight into site statistics and usage patterns. This will 
enable GICHD to identify necessary site improvements 
including usage in particular regions. 
* CORD administrators can now export raw data more 
easily and export a group of ordnance items to PDF. 
In time, this could lead to ordnance guide extracts of 
CORD being available on special request. Given the 
quality management requirements involved, such re-
quests are likely to be resource intensive and thus only 
available at the discretion of the GICHD.
Changes in CORD Content
A number of changes in the content of CORD were made. 
Foremost among these changes was revising the categoriza-
tion of ordnance, known historically as Ordnance Type in 
CORD (the equivalent of Ordnance Type in the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is Category). 
It should be clearly stated that there is no internationally 
agreed system of categorizing ordnance. For example, some 
categorize mortar rounds as projectiles. Others categorize 
Figure 4. The old CORD entry layout for the PRB-BAC anti-personnel (AP) 
mine. Note the old Disposal Options that are no longer a part of CORD. 
Also note the generic disposal diagram showing charge placement on an 
M-19 AV mine, an M-16 AP bounding fragmentation mine, and on a gener-
ic anti-vehicle mine. Such diagrams will be progressively removed from 
CORD entries over the coming months.
them as a separate group in their own right. Some categorize 
rocket propelled grenades (RPG) as rockets, some as grenades, 
others categorize RPGs as recoilless projectiles. It is unlikely 
that a categorization system that would please everyone ful-
ly could be chosen. However, the slightly expanded Ordnance 
Type list adopted is hopefully a reasonable compromise and 
an improvement on what was used before. 
The number of ordnance types listed in CORD has ex-
panded from eleven to eighteen. The old Landmines type has 
been split into AP Mines and AV Mines. What was previously 
designated as Scatterable Munitions is now split between a 
new Ordnance Type, Submunitions and others, such as AP 
Mines. Mortar Rounds were previously listed as Projectiles. 
Technically, this is perfectly reasonable, but it was decid-
ed that since the Projectiles group was so large, it would be 
53
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 21.3
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017
54 FIELD NOTES @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION
good to split off a new Ordnance Type categorized as Mortar 
Rounds. Other new Ordnance Types include Fuzes, Small 
Arms Ammunition (SAA) (for projectiles ≤ 20 mm), Naval 
Ordnance, Firing Devices and Switches, Demolition Stores, 
and Locally Manufactured Munitions (LMM). LMM is an 
Ordnance Type for all the artisanal munitions being pro-
duced, e.g., in areas of Syria. An 82 mm, high explosive mor-
tar round produced in a workshop would be categorized as 
a LMM. A challenge in populating this Ordnance Type will 
be naming items—the range of different models often do not 
have agreed model names or titles. More Ordnance Types 
may be added in the future, for example a new Recoilless 
Ammunition type.
In time, it is possible that entries in CORD will be 
subcategorized. For instance, an anti-personnel (AP) mine 
may be subcategorized as an AP blast mine, AP direction-
al fragmentation mine, AP omni-directional fragmentation 
mine, AP bounding fragmentation mine, etc. This would be 
a significant task for each ordnance type and would possibly 
be subject to some debate in the industry. Nevertheless, it is 
a logical task for CORD to embrace. Ideally there would be 
an agreed standardized categorization system for ordnance, 
perhaps as part of the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS). For now, CORD will only categorize at a first level, 
i.e., Ordnance Type, and at a last level, i.e., the model name 
of the item.
Next Steps
The task of improving content in CORD is in many ways 
only just beginning. It is a daunting task and the resources 
available for this are limited. From late 2017 onwards, GICHD 
staff will commence a review of entries, checking for specifica-
tion accuracy and adding more item imagery where possible. 
After all, CORD is primarily an aid to identification, which is 
a visual process. There is also a need to fill in some gaps. For 
example, some common submunitions do not yet have an en-
try in CORD. Ordnance Types such as Fuzes and LMM re-
quire populating. The process is not time limited; it should go 
on for as long as CORD is in existence. Each entry also needs 
accurate information about where it is being used. We can 
scan social media for evidence of the use of a particular item 
in a given country, but this may be difficult to corroborate. 
Nothing beats positive identification of items on the ground 
by experienced operators. 
The use of ordnance in conflicts is constantly evolving and 
CORD needs to try to keep up. There are new ordnance cat-
egories that represent this, in particular LMM, intended spe-
cifically for conflicts in the Middle East but also for items like 
improvised victim operated AP mines in countries such as 
Colombia. New entries must be created to reflect the situation 
on the ground. Please help us by sending any relevant infor-
mation on these items, be it a Hell Cannon in Syria or a chem-
ical AP mine in Colombia. 
In short, CORD needs your help. If you are in the field and 
can confirm an item is being used in a given country but is 
not reflected in the CORD database, please get in touch using 
the contact details on the CORD website. Better still, if you 
have a photo of an item in the field and are willing for it to be 
on CORD, please send it in. Image copyright using the new 
photo captions now available will always be acknowledged. 
Furthermore, if you see an error in CORD, perhaps a speci-
fication detail that is incorrect or a detail for which we do not 
have but you do, please contact us.
Usage figures for CORD are encouraging; however, we will 
always need help to make the information more accurate and 
up-to-date. CORD is an important resource for HMA and be-
yond. With your help, it can continue to be so. 
The CORD database can be accessed at: http://ordata.info. 
You may follow CORD on social media via Facebook 
(@therealcord.id), Twitter (@threalCORD_ID), or Instagram 
(@cord_id), or get in touch via email CORD@gichd.org. 
Roly Evans
Advisor, Land Release and Operational Efficiency
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
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that the application is in 
line with their vision for 
the CORD database. 
There is no greater 
source of information 
than the local popula-
tion who spend their 
lives working and living 
in the vicinity of land-
mines and unexploded 
ordnance (UXO). Couple 
this proximity with the 
dramatic advances in 
mobile technology, often 
in the most rural areas, 
and you have an oppor-
tunity for the collection 
of a vast amount of in-
formation regarding the 
location and extent of 
explosive hazard con-
tamination prior to any 
surveying operation be-
ing conducted. Having access to technology such as the Landmines 
App provides a common tool that allows for a more accurate and 
thorough sharing of information between the local population and 
demining organizations. It is hoped that future versions of this ap-
plication can include information from the field such as updated im-
ages that capture what these ordnance items actually look like after 
being exposed to the elements for decades. 
Making Ordnance Identification 
Available to Everyone
by Howard Rudat [ MAPPS, Inc. ]
The continued focus on the use of mobile technology in support of humanitarian demining operations has not only highlighted how these technologies 
can be adapted and used but has also resulted in tangible tools 
that can be put to use now. Despite these advances, the cost 
and availability of these capabilities remains a challenge when 
resources are limited. Together, the U.S. Army’s Unexploded 
Ordnance Center of Excellence (UXOCOE), the Center for 
International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR) at James 
Madison University, and the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) have solved a key part of 
that problem by providing resources and access to make a criti-
cal set of information available to a wide audience at no cost: 
the Collaborative ORDnance Data Repository (CORD). CORD 
provides access to over 5,000 ordnance items that assist demin-
ing organizations in the proper identification of explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW), including data on over 700 landmines. 
Unfortunately, until recently, this information was only avail-
able when connected to the internet or when using specific de-
mining toolsets that included the CORD information.  
The resources and access provided by UXOCOE, CISR, and 
GICHD respectively have now allowed for the development of 
an Android-based, mobile application called Landmines App, 
which contains the 700 landmine records available in the larg-
er CORD database. The Landmine App is available as a free 
download on the Google Play Store. Anyone with an Android 
smartphone can now download the landmine information 
contained in CORD for use anytime, anywhere—no internet 
connection or specialized mobile devices are required. It can 
be accessed at http://bit.ly/2qy4t1Q.     
Developed by MAPPS, Inc., this application is seen as the 
first step in a crowd-based solution to the global mine problem. 
By empowering the local population with information and 
tools, they can assist in creating baseline information to as-
sist demining operations in the future. Using the Google Play 
Store, users can provide feedback on the application, which 
will ensure that future versions of the application are devel-
oped based on the needs of the community, making the appli-
cation even more valuable. Provided the necessary resources 
are available, any updates to the Landmines App would be co-
ordinated with GICHD, which now manages CORD, to insure 
Figure 1. Landmines Application in Google Play 
store. 
Figure courtesy of Google.
Howard Rudat
CEO/Founder 
MAPPS, Inc.
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Field Notes
States affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are faced with a number of diffi-
cult decisions when they establish their 
mine action program, such as “how deep 
should operators clear?” and “what tasks 
should they do first?” The deliberations 
and conclusions that ultimately are drawn 
together in national standards are part of 
an implicit or explicit risk management 
approach. Over time, risk assessments re-
quire review and modification to reflect 
different contexts. 
States embark on proactive efforts to find mines and ERW 
that pose the greatest risk immediately after a conflict (typi-
cally aided by the international community). Thanks to the 
survey and clearance carried out in the proactive phase, risks 
gradually decline. The analysis of risk and the accompanying 
mine action response must therefore be carried out for various 
phases in a mine action program. The shorter-term proactive 
phase will imply a heavier investment of targeted resources 
to reduce the risk to acceptable levels, while long-term risk 
management (LTRM) issues constitute the reactive phase and 
should be mainstreamed into sustainable, nationally-owned 
structures. This article describes the process of evaluating 
the probabilities and consequences of adverse events that de-
termine long-term risk and the implications of effective risk 
management for how mine action programs are structured 
and managed over time.2  
Establishing country-specific roadmaps for transition from 
proactive survey and clearance to a reactive phase is an impor-
tant process for each mine action program, as this should de-
fine what the residual state will be. It is the prerogative of the 
national authority to establish what the residual or end state is 
while working with key stakeholders. The mine action sector 
has spent much time and energy in productively developing 
and improving cost-efficient methodologies for land release 
through survey and clearance of suspected and confirmed 
hazardous areas (SHA/CHA). The most difficult element of 
these discussions involves the criteria for releasing land in a 
The Challenge of Long-term Risk 
Management in Mine Action1 
by Robert White [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
Figure 1. Program life cycle for mine action: planning for long-term risk management.
All graphics courtesy of GICHD.
national context. For example, what are the determined clear-
ance depth and fade-out requirements, and the potential cost 
of returning to areas and clearing low-density contamination 
at a later date? Unless recontamination occurs, the commit-
ment of additional resources is considered unreasonable since 
the costs for logistics and support in clearing the site would 
be roughly doubled. These discussions will inevitably lead to a 
review and evaluation of the relative cost of survey and clear-
ance, and the opportunity costs of resources that are, or can 
be, made available. 
These issues need to be considered against appropriate 
strategic planning and risk management methodologies to 
develop effective/efficient systems for addressing any remain-
ing mine/ERW threat, from proactive survey and clearance 
to reactive risk management strategy. National standards 
and relevant treaty frameworks require every effort in clear-
ing the mine/ERW threat, but there are inevitably diminish-
ing returns in the investment costs of proactive survey and 
clearance.3 The ratio of items found against land processed is 
becoming an increasingly important indicator of effective-
ness. Moreover, the cost of clearing areas where no mine/
ERW threat is found must be justified more convincingly 
than suggesting that community confidence building is a 
sufficient rationale to spend donor millions. The balance and 
tipping point between proactive survey and clearance and re-
active risk management strategy is significant in the life cycle 
of a program. 
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Life Cycle of a Mine/ERW Program
As a country or region recovers from conflict, clearing 
mines and ERW becomes less of an immediate emergency and 
high priority, with reactive responses replacing proactive sur-
vey and clearance program over varying timeframes. As time 
goes on, the United Nations, specialist NGOs, and commer-
cial operations terminate programs, and leave or hand over 
assets to national ownership. All mine action/human secu-
rity programs operate within this continuum, represented in 
Figure 1. The capacities to respond tend to be confined to a 
few specialist military/police units, civil defense, fire service, 
and commercial service provision, the scale of which is de-
termined by the need of governments and/or market forces.4
In countries approaching this transition, there are oppor-
tunities to apply principles of strategic planning and risk 
management to develop effective risk management systems 
addressing any residual mines and ERW that are well adapted 
to local circumstances and conditions. 
A Risk Management Approach
Reducing risk to a level as low as rea-
sonably practicable (ALARP) should ap-
ply to the management of residual mine/
ERW situations (see Figure 2). There are 
risks that are generally accepted as be-
ing so low that no action is required, 
and there are risks that are clearly 
unacceptable. Between those two rela-
tively straightforward categories lies a 
range of risks and situations. ALARP, 
and all reasonable effort (discussed lat-
er in the article) embody a concept that 
additional survey and clearance can-
not be justified in terms of the benefits 
that would accrue from the extra ex-
penditure of time, resources, or money, 
leaving the challenge of managing the 
residual mine/ERW threat.   
The International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) define residual risk as 
“the risk remaining following the appli-
cation of all reasonable efforts to iden-
tify, define and remove all presence and 
suspicion of mines/ERW through non-
technical survey, technical survey and/
or clearance.”5 It is logical to understand 
residual contamination as the sites or 
areas where mines or ERW are discov-
ered following the application of all reasonable efforts to sur-
vey/identify and then process (cancel, reduce, or clear) all 
known SHAs and CHAs in a given locality.6 
Reactive management of risks posed by residual contami-
nation requires a different approach to the one that was uti-
lized during the proactive survey and clearance phase. This 
requires a review of the established institutional architec-
ture, as well as the development of evidence-based systems, 
tools, and processes. Whichever approach is adopted in each 
country-specific scenario will rely on the information that is 
available to assess risk. Quantifying or predicting the known 
unknowns is problematic and a constraint on stating what 
level of resource may be required to effectively address any re-
sidual contamination.  
It should be noted that risks are not only those that have 
the potential to cause direct human harm, but may also in-
clude those that can inf luence economic activity, freedom 
of movement, and other aspects of importance to a society 
and economy.
Figure 2. The As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) concept (after ISO 21010).
Figure 3. National mine action program.
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A rigorous approach to responding to all mine/ERW risks 
that affect the achievement of a country s` economic objectives 
could be one framework on which to base the management of 
residual mines and ERW. A risk management strategy embed-
ded in a national system would allow the potentially negative 
impact of residual mines and ERW to be mitigated effectively. 
The objective of residual risk management is to fully under-
stand the nature of the residual risks to which governments 
and communities are being exposed, and then implement sen-
sible, cost-effective measures to minimize the downside and 
maximize the upside (Figure 3).  
The purpose of risk identification is to understand the real-
ity of mine/ERW risks, as opposed to the perception of those 
risks. The way in which mine/ERW risks are perceived by soci-
ety and the general public is an important part of the context, 
but effective management of residual mines and ERW is based 
upon identifying and understanding the reality of those risks. 
Residual risks only exist when three associated factors com-
bine: an explosive hazard must be present at a location where 
an activity capable of interacting with the hazard is taking 
place or will take place. In the risk diagram (Figure 4), a real 
risk only arises in the central red zone of the diagram. All 
three contributing factors need to be understood when identi-
fying residual risks of mines and ERW, and that perception of 
risk may extend outside the red zone. 
Specific countries or regions that moved from a proactive to 
a reactive approach to mines and ERW should note the devel-
opments made over recent years in approaches to represent-
ing risk impact and likelihood. Many organizations outside 
mine action now take account of adverse events that are rare 
or unprecedented, where the rules are unknown or rapidly 
changing, or where risks are driven by external factors beyond 
their control.7 These risks, which have high impact and low 
likelihood of occurrence, are now accepted by many as having 
greater importance than those with a high likelihood of oc-
currence and an insignificant impact. In the case of residual 
mines and ERW, the concept of impact and the likelihood of 
events occurring should be given prominence in risk assess-
ment and processes.8 
The risk matrix in Figure 5 shows an approach to repre-
senting LTRM in a residual context by increasing the weight-
ing of the potential impact of an event against likelihood. This 
works on a scoring of xy + y, where x is likelihood and y is 
impact (Figure 5). This formula multiplies impact with likeli-
hood then adds a weighting again for impact. It should be re-
membered that the scoring of risk magnitude often involves a 
degree of judgement or subjectivity. Where data or informa-
tion on past events or patterns is available, it will enable more 
evidence-based risk judgements. In interpreting the risk ma-
trix the color codes are:
* Red represents major or extreme/catastrophic risks that 
score 15 or more (ALARP: Unacceptable).
* Amber represents moderate or major risks that score 
between 8 and 14 (ALARP: Tolerable only if risk reduc-
tion is impracticable, or if cost is grossly disproportionate 
to improvement gained).
* Blue represents minor or insignificant risks scoring 7 or 
less (ALARP: Broadly acceptable region).9 
When addressing large, air-dropped munitions, the prob-
ability/incidence rate and severe consequence of an accident 
would support discussion of a greater weighting of impact 
on the risk matrix to use a formula of xy + 2y (represented 
in Figure 6). This will allow consideration of the fact that on 
rare occasions improbable events do occur with devastating 
effects. The weighting of impact brings almost half the risk 
Figure 4. Real ERW risks.
Figure 5. Risk matrix scoring of xy + y.
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management framework results into the ALARP unaccept-
able region, which is a strategic challenge for finding the 
appropriate response to address residual contamination, par-
ticularly for residual large, air-dropped munitions.  
Locating UXO on a construction site in the United Kingdom 
is considered by the Construction Industry Research and 
Information Association (CIRIA), as a “high consequence but 
low probability event.”10 CIRIA recommends that “appropri-
ate allowance should be made at the design stage for assess-
ing the risk of encountering UXO on-site and for mitigating 
that risk if significant,” suggesting that factors such as public 
safety, on-site safety, neighboring buildings, secondary haz-
ards, and the safe excavation and disposal of UXO targets are 
considerations in developing an investigation methodolo-
gy.10 A version of this approach should be applied in countries 
that reach a residual mine/ERW management state, partic-
ularly where large, air-dropped munitions were a feature of 
the conflict.
Evidence-based Risk Management
A key area of focus for LTRM must be on the integrity of 
survey and clearance data, and how that can be used to in-
form risk management decision making once the proactive 
survey and clearance activity has 
ceased.11 Future decision making will 
benefit from access to comprehensive 
data on survey and clearance. The 
risk management issue of clearance 
depth relates directly to land use. If 
the land is for current agricultural 
use in countries such as Cambodia, 
Laos, and Vietnam, then the na-
tional standard survey and clear-
ance depth does mitigate the threat 
to communities. If land use in spe-
cific areas changes through infra-
structure development, urbanization, 
construction, etc., a risk review/response will be need-
ed before activity takes place. Therefore, communica-
tion and record keeping during the land release process 
is crucial for the future management of residual risk. If the 
survey and clearance data is absent or inconsistent, the resid-
ual risk management approach has less evidence on which to 
base decisions.
This issue is illustrated using data from the LWCC Quang 
Tri database in Vietnam. The contamination survey and clear-
ance map (Figure 7) was built using the survey and clearance 
records from Cam Lo District, Vietnam. Each red dot indi-
cated a mine or item of ERW located and cleared to the 30 cm 
(11.8 in) national survey and clearance depth.
This returns the land to communities in Cam Lo to safe 
use for current activity and agricultural practices—a com-
pliant residual state. Any change in land use at a later date, 
illustrated in Figure 8, will introduce the residual risk- 
management questions relating to items potentially located be-
low the Vietnam national standard 30 cm (11.8 in) threshold.
The discussions on residual management led to revisiting 
the question of  what the sector means by safe following survey 
and clearance to national standards (when based on IMAS). 
The standard clearance depths differ from country to coun-
try; e.g., for cluster munition remnants: Cambodia’s is 20 cm 
(7.9 in), Lao’s is 25 cm (9.8 in), Vietnam’s is 30 cm (11.8 in). 
This represents the national authority agreement, described in 
the national standards, on the required risk mitigation to an 
acceptable level in order to hand back land to communities 
free from immediate threat. 
Responsible authorities and mine action operators always 
ensure that survey and clearance are completed comprehen-
sively, and record the location, items, and depth, guaranteeing 
that everything is documented for a defined handover to the 
recognized authority. This activity delivers a specific, defined 
Figure 6. Risk matrix scoring of xy + 2y.
Figure 7. Contamination survey and clearance map of Cam Lo District, Vietnam.
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record of the safe land to allow com-
munities and others to manage future 
developments. Inconsistencies in re-
cording data and in data management 
remain ongoing challenges for evi-
dence-based LTRM. 
Summary
The sector needs to continue asking 
“what needs to be done now to ensure 
that an effective risk management re-
sponse can be delivered in the future?” 
It is important to be able to support 
evidence-based, risk management de-
cision making with comprehensive 
data sets on survey and clearance (type 
of target, location, depth). It is also im-
portant to note that the answer to 
“what is safe?" will change over time as 
land use changes. Procedures should 
be adapted in a residual mine/ERW 
management phase to accommodate 
this, as has already been demonstrated 
in post-conflict scenarios in Europe 
addressing UXO from World War I 
and II, and in current and concluding 
mine action programs, particularly 
when related to infrastructure devel-
opment and construction. There are 
key challenges, specific to each country 
that must be overcome. These include 
the decision on when to move from proactive survey and 
clearance to a reactive risk management strategy response, 
and what constitutes every effort, all reasonable effort, or 
ALARP to meet treaty obligations and compliance. A risk 
management strategy is required to understand residual risk 
on areas released through non-technical survey, technical sur-
vey, and clearance. The different contexts found in programs 
that are geographically and socio-politically diverse will dic-
tate resource management, capacity development, and sus-
tainable choices on relevant tools and approaches, supporting 
risk management strategies to react cost effectively to a resid-
ual mine/ERW threat. 
See endnotes page 67
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Figure 8. Land-use change.
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BLACK ADDER DISRUPTORS
By Andy Smith [ University of Genoa ] and William Bagley [ JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY ]
This article reports on an empirical re-search and development project con-ducted in collaboration by researchers 
at University of Genoa, Italy, and Johns 
Hopkins University, United States. It is a 
progress report summarizing one element of 
a broader effort that is intended to provide 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) opera-
tors with reliable, open-source information 
to assist in the development of low-order mu-
nitions disruptors. Providing operators the 
information necessary to make energetic tools 
not only reduces cost but can also circumvent 
the restrictions and delays that often compli-
cate the import of disruptor components.
MUNITION DISRUPTORS
The disruptors described here use an ex-
plosively formed penetrator (EFP) to breach 
a munitions’ casing and initiate a burn of the 
high-explosive fill. The burn may consume the 
entire explosive content but more often leads 
to a deflagration, a partial detonation, or a full 
detonation. It is accepted that there is always a 
risk of high order detonation of the target mu-
nition so these disruptors are only used when 
a full detonation would be an acceptable, if 
undesirable, outcome.
The penetrator is formed by the detona-
tion of an explosive charge inside the disrup-
tor body in contact with a specifically shaped 
liner. This has the effect of focusing increased 
energy toward the target upon detonation, as 
first noted by Munroe in 1888. This phenom-
enon was extensively studied and exploit-
ed for use in the design of weapon systems 
and in explosive tunneling procedures. It 
was found, for example, that the geometry of 
the liner shape is critical for armor penetra-
tion and that adding other elements such as 
wave shapers inside the charge can further 
increase the concentration of the detonation 
forces. Complex liner designs are not believed 
to be necessary for munitions disruption pur-
poses for which the liner is generally a sim-
ple, shallow cap of metal. On detonation of 
the disruptor, the liner collapses inward and 
is projected under immense pressure toward 
the target. Upon penetration of the target, the 
energy released should start a fire in the high-
explosive (HE) content. If it burns too fast, 
the explosive will detonate. If it burns too 
slowly, the fire will be extinguished and the 
munition left hazardous.
The Black Adder disruptor.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
DETONATOR
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LINER
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Figure 1. EFP Disruptor components.
The Research and Development section is
 sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense
Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence
https://www.uxocoe.com
61
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 21.3
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION 62
BODY
LINER
DETONATOR GUIDE
STANDOFF TUBE
FOOT
Figure 2. The Black Adder body is designed to control variables 
during testing.
Experimental liners.
Baldric liners.
A commonly used munition disruptor liner is a shallow cap of pressed 
copper, commonly called the Baldric. Alternatives that are intended to 
increase the probability of low-order neutralization success use pressed-
sheet magnesium in place of copper.
To provide controls by which to measure success, we used simple 
liners of copper and magnesium. Without the time or resources to ap-
proach this with the disciplined theoretical rigor that may have been 
ideal, we then used an informed but informal approach to design new 
disruptor liners that would be low-cost, easy to make, and more reliable 
than those commonly used. Strictly controlling variables in empirical 
testing allowed rapid progress to be made. 
CONTROLLING VARIABLES
It is known that disruptor reliability can be affected by the presence 
of air voids in the HE used to fill the disruptor in the field. It can also 
be affected by the distance between the disruptor and the target, and by 
the positioning of the detonator in relation to the liner. To control these 
variables during testing, we designed the simple disruptor body shown 
(see Figure 2).
This Black Adder body design is expensive when compared to using 
an off-cut of plumping pipe and wire. It was designed to control vari-
ables in liner testing rather than provide a disruptor body that is cheap 
to make in the field. It was our intent to control other variables as strict-
ly as practicable so that the only variable that could alter the outcome 
would be the new design of liner we made.
All liners were designed to penetrate at least 10 mm of steel and de-
liver a payload that encourages the HE to burn. Some liner designs were 
highly speculative as we experimented with geometry, shaping materi-
als, and fire-inducing payloads in a way that was intended to provide an 
indication of which liner would be worth continued testing.
EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY ONE
The use of a clear, acrylic body was novel. To discover whether its fail-
ure to confine the detonation in the same manner as a steel body would 
cause problems, we carried out our first series of eight disruptor blast 
tests against inert targets. 
The tests included a control to allow comparison between a standard, 
steel-cased Baldric disruptor and the acrylic-bodied Black Adder dis-
ruptor. Both had simple, copper-cap liners, the same stand-off and the 
same HE charge. The Black Adder liner penetrated the target to a great-
er depth and with a larger, cleaner hole than the control. It was also 
observed, as an incidental benefit, that the Black Adder body burned 
up without fragmentation, which made it less hazardous in use than a 
steel body.
We went on to try several liner designs but, with no reliable way of re-
cording the spread of the liner material inside the inert target, we were 
not able to learn enough to make any informed comparison between the 
various liner behavior after entry.
EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY TWO
Day two involved testing two control and eight unproven liner designs 
against inert targets. A witness piece that would provide a useful compar-
ison of liner designs without using live munitions was devised and placed 
inside a length of 5 mm steel box section with a 5 mm steel plate on top. 
This arrangement required the new liner to penetrate 10 mm of steel be-
fore entering the witness piece, which then provided a useful record of the 
intensity and spread of burning material inside the target.
In two series of five disruptor blasts, the effects of eight unproven lin-
ers and two controls were recorded. The HE available to charge the dis-
ruptors had a lower velocity of detonation than in the original test, but 
the results in the series would still be valid for comparison because the 
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charge was uniform within that test series. 
Analysis of the results allowed two of the ex-
perimental liner designs to be discarded and 
the remaining six to be ranked in order of 
what was believed to be their potential to pro-
duce the desired effect.
EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY THREE
On day three, tests of the remaining experi-
mental liners against live munitions was con-
ducted. Generally, there is a greater chance of 
causing a detonation with small munitions 
because the point of attack with the disruptor 
will always be close to the fuze. Test articles 
Disruptor being used against an inert target.
Witness piece.
Setup showing five Black Adders prepared to fire.
The witness pieces provided a valuable, permanent record of the impact and the spread of material in-
side the targets.
for this series were 82 mm HE mortars that 
had been recently manufactured. Being facto-
ry fresh was a detail that we hoped would en-
sure consistency among targets. 
In each test, the feet of the Black Adder dis-
ruptor were taped in the same position on the 
target, and care was taken to ensure that the 
standoff, charge weight, and depth of detona-
tor insertion were identical. 
The copper control liner was used twice 
and, in both cases, the projectile penetrated 
both sides of the mortar casing without caus-
ing a burn or a detonation. This showed too 
much penetration and was an unsatisfactory 
result; the mortars were later destroyed using 
explosive donor charges.
The magnesium control liner was used 
twice and produced different results. In one 
instance, the mortar burned out and was 
thrown more than 100 meters away. In the 
other, the munition deflagrated. Both results 
were good, and the result provides evidence 
in support of the claim that a pressed mag-
nesium cap has advantages. But the results 
showed inconsistency.
Four different Black Adder liner designs 
were then tested (two liner designs remain 
untested due to lack of range time). When a 
liner performed well, the test was repeated to 
ensure that the result had a good chance of 
63
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 21.3
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION 64
82 mm HE mortar bombs. A charged Black Adder ready to fire.
Burned out mortar shell (left) and deflagrated munition (right).
New liner one: mortar left in a hazardous condition.
New liner two: deflagrated mortar (left) and burned out mortar shell (right).
New liner three: in both mortars, the HE burned to deflagration.
An improvised and low-cost disruptor body with 
all of the variable control features of those used 
in our tests.
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being replicated. If a liner did not demonstrate the desired low-order 
disruption, it was not selected for additional tests.
 
NEW LINER ONE
In the first test using one of our experimental designs of liner, the 
munition was penetrated and some of the explosive filling had burned; 
there was no deflagration and the fuze was left in place. As this was an 
unsatisfactory result, the liner was set aside.
NEW LINER TWO
In the first test with liner two, the HE burned and increased pres-
sure inside the mortar and blew off the fuze, leaving some unburned 
explosive loose inside an intact casing. In the second test with this 
liner, the munition def lagrated. This was a result very similar to that 
achieved with the magnesium control liner. Both results were good, 
but inconsistent.
NEW LINER THREE
In both tests with liner three, the mortar deflagrated cleanly and a 
small amount of unburned HE was expelled. This was almost the best 
result possible and showed consistency.
NEW LINER FOUR
In both tests with liner four, the mortar completely burned out with 
no deflagration. This was the best possible result and showed consisten-
cy; it was also where we ran out of time.
DISCUSSION
The test results demonstrate that using a disruptor liner to deliver 
a payload that encourages the explosive content to burn can have ad-
vantages in terms of effectiveness and consistency when compared with 
simple, metal cap-liners. Results suggest which liners performed best, 
but the test set was small and the limited number of tests meant that the 
liners included payload and architecture variables that need to be ex-
plored further. For example, the geometry of liner four is complex and 
may not need to be if it was actually the unique payload that achieved the 
desired low-order effects. 
Referring back to our goals, the experimental liner materials selec-
tion criteria required that they be low-cost and not subject to shipping 
controls. The liners and payload ingredients could be imported without 
restriction or self-manufactured in any area of need. Some liner archi-
tecture is complex, and it is highly probable that similar results can be 
achieved with liner designs that would be much easier to make. After 
one or more proven liners have been selected for further development, 
the improvisation of disruptor bodies using large medical syringes or 
similarly locally-sourced material will be explored.
These results are encouraging and provide a limited set of results 
from which to refine the designs for further empirical testing. Only after 
repeated trials with consistent results will similar tests prove anything 
compelling about any individual liner shape or payload. This work will 
New liner four: an ideal result with all HE burned and no fragmentation.
continue as support permits, and we hope that a conclusion of value to 
field operatives can be published soon.  
See endnotes page 67
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Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards by Rhodes, Ph.D. [ from page 4 ]
1. An IED is defined as a ‘device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, py-
rotechnic materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-
military components’ (IMAS 04.10 3.134: 2013 & IATG 01.40:2011). Those victim–operated devices laid as landmines are referred to in this paper as locally 
manufactured landmines or improvised landmines .
2. The phrase ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ is redundant as Mine Action by definition is humanitarian. In this paper Mine Action is used where others may 
use the phrase Humanitarian Mine Action.
3. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 13.
4. Email correspondence with The Halo Trust. Statistics current to August 2017.
5. Email correspondence with MAG. Statistics current to August 2017.
6. Email correspondence with DAICMA. Statistics current to July 2017.
7. IMAS 01.10 Section 5.
8. IMAS 01.10 Section 6.2.
9. Mine action operators must therefore conduct risk assessments that include proper assessments of the conflict in question and of the actors involved. Such 
assessments will examine whether areas being targeted for clearance are permissive environments, where explosive devices are no longer in use for the par-
ties to the conflict, or whether conflict is ‘active’ in a given area and therefore not appropriate for mine action operations.
10. http://www.mineaction.org/improvised-explosive-device-lexicon.
11. Understanding the Regional and Transnational Networks that Facilitate IED Use, AOAV, 2017.
12. For instance IMAS 09.11 concerns Battle Area Clearance ‘including UXO, AXO, booby traps and failed, or abandoned, IEDs left behind after hostilities 
have ceased.’
13. IMAS 04.10 and IATG definition: EO - all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This in-
cludes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; 
pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs); and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature. 
14. IMAS 04.10 anti-personnel landmine definition - ‘a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapaci-
tate, injure or kill one or more persons’. The definition of an anti-personnel mine by virtue of its emphasis on the impact of the munition, as opposed to its 
construction, includes mines that have been constructed in an improvised manner. This is well documented in the negotiations for the treaty. 
15. See extent of improvised devices from the operational statistics of one mine action operator, MAG: Figures 3 and 4.
16. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 10.
Quality Management and Standards for Humanitarian Improvised Explosive Device (HIED) Response Activities by Keeley [ from page 9 ]
1. See the UNMAS mine action portal at http://www.mineaction.org/issues.
2. Assuming victim assistance is mainstreamed into health and disability sectors and supported by specialist organizations that may not be involved in the 
‘field’ elements of mine action.
3. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0418.
4. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0419.
5. Based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10 2nd Edition Amdt 3, Para 3.168.
6. See the explanation of response time analysis in “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”, Griffin and 
Keeley, 2004.
7. “Indemnify.” The Free Dictionary. Accessed 13 September 2017. http://bit.ly/2h1en9C. 
Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM by Isikozlu, Krötz, and Trancart [ from page 14 ]
1. Loughran, Chris. “Developing good practice for measuring the success, effectiveness and impact of PSSM”, Manchester: MAG, May 2016. Accessed 4 August 
2017. http://bit.ly/2weqsLy. 
2. Other agreements that are in force in the region include the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (2004) and most recently, the Kinshasa Convention (2017).
3. “ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.” Article 24(1). Accessed 4 August 2017. http://
bit.ly/1wPPgSM. 
4. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk and Michael Ashkenazi. “Practices and approaches towards arms and ammunition management in Mali.” Unpublished report. 
Bonn: BICC, 2015.
5. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk. “’Guns are for the Government’: An evaluation of a BICC advisory project on state-owned arms control in South Sudan.” BICC 
Working paper. Bonn: BICC, 2014.
Promoting Secure Stockpiles and Countering Diversion by Berman and King [ from page 18 ]
1. Any list of partners supporting Small Arms Survey projects would include the Danish Demining Group, The HALO Trust, Handicap International, Mines 
Advisory Group, and the United Nations Mines Action Service. Additional partners appear elsewhere in this short article. This list is indicative and not ex-
haustive.
2. MSAG is an apolitical, informal, and multinational platform of a dozen or so like-minded governments that, to the extent possible, since 2005 have worked 
together to support each other’s efforts to improve stockpile management practices across the globe. See www.msag.es.
3. Berman, Eric G., and Pilar Reina. “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Concerns and Consequences.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action. 16.2 
(2012): 4–9.
4. The PSSM Best Practice Cards are available in Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS—in the Latin alphabet), French, 
Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Swahili. 
5. For example, over the past three years, the Survey has added eight incidents and deleted five during the period 1979–2013.
6. See http://bit.ly/2llTGH8.
7. The UEMS Database records 19 events as having occurred in the United States, which have resulted in four dead and two injured. By way of comparison, 
while casualty data for many incidents is incomplete (including for those in the United States), the average number of casualties recorded for the other 548 
UEMS in the 100 other countries in the database comes to more than 50.
8. The RASR Initiative Steering Committee comprises the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House 
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and the Small Arms Survey. The nine participating states since 2009, when the Initiative was 
launched, include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. WRA provided funding 
from 2009 through 2015. The European Union is funding RASR for the 2017–2019 period. Moldova has been invited to contribute to the Initiative. For more 
information. See www.rasrinitaitive.org.
9. Gobinet, Pierre, and Jovana Carapic. “Less Bang for the Buck: Stockpile Management in South-east Europe.” Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the 
World (2015): 125–155.
10. Parker, Sarah. Facilitating PSSM Assistance in the Sahel and Beyond: Introducing the PSSM Priorities Matrix. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2016.
11.  Berman, Eric G., Mihaela Racovita and Matt Schroeder. Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations. Geneva: 
Small Arms Survey, 2017.
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